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Nonmarket Criminal Justice Fees
ARIEL JUROW KLEIMAN†
The public finance literature tells us that user fees will introduce market-like efficiency to public
good provision. Meanwhile, criminal justice scholars note that criminal justice fees have run
amok, causing crippling debt, undermining reentry efforts, and raising civil rights and
constitutional concerns. This Article reconciles these seemingly opposed perspectives, arguing
that criminal justice fees have become harmful precisely because they deviate from the traditional
market-like environment that the public finance literature envisions. This nonmarket structure
occurs for two reasons. First, criminal justice agencies are monopolistic providers of mandatory
services, and second, criminal defendants cannot or do not consider the fee amount when deciding
how to behave. As a result, criminal justice fees operate without meaningful restraint, and instead
face upward pressure from monopolistic agencies seeking increased revenue. Adjudicating
courts, meanwhile, have diluted judicial fee requirements to accommodate increasingly creative
user fee structures. These unbounded, nonmarket fees incentivize misallocation of public
resources, heighten the risk of exploitation of powerless groups, cause significant human
suffering, and deny payors meaningful protection from exploitative government exactions.
In addition to offering a public-finance-based critique of criminal justice fees, the Article
harnesses such reasoning to offer a framework for evaluating other potentially exploitative
nonmarket fees. Policymakers and advocates can use this framework to prevent unbounded
nonmarket fees before they become entrenched revenue streams. The Article also offers reforms
for criminal justice fees, with the goal of meaningfully restraining the fees and correcting perverse
agency incentives. Suggested reforms include increasing judicial scrutiny, prohibiting local
agencies from keeping the fee revenue they collect, and placing a low per-person cap on total
fees.
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INTRODUCTION
Eileen DeNino could not afford to pay the court fees and fines from her
children’s truancy. While serving a two-day jail sentence for nonpayment of the
debt, Eileen died from health complications.1 Like Eileen, others who cannot
afford to pay these criminal justice fees face life-altering punishment—from
drivers’ license suspension, to disenfranchisement, to imprisonment.2
Distinct from fines (which seek to punish) and restitution (which seeks to
make victims whole), criminal justice fees seek to raise revenue.3 These fees
reimburse government for the cost of running the criminal justice system by
offloading expenses onto system users. They begin at arrest and accrue
throughout adjudication, incarceration, and supervision, covering costs ranging
from prosecutor expenses, to prison room and board, to ankle monitors.4 They
attach to all manner of transgressions, from parking tickets to felonies,5 and
become quite substantial as they accumulate, with amounts reported around
$2,000 to $3,000 per infraction.6

1. Alan Pyke, Impoverished Mother Dies in Jail Cell Over Unpaid Fines for Her Kids Missing School,
THINKPROGRESS (June 12, 2014, 1:25 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/impoverished-mother-dies-in-jail-cellover-unpaid-fines-for-her-kids-missing-school-42e61922a8e4/.
2. News outlets are replete with stories of the collateral consequences of unpaid court costs. See, e.g.,
Merrit Kennedy, ACLU Sues Over Florida Law That Requires Felons to Pay Fees, Fines Before Voting, NPR
(July 1, 2019, 5:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737668646/aclu-sues-over-florida-law-that-requiresfelons-to-pay-fees-fines-before-voting (reporting on a Florida law that restricts the voting rights of those who
owe criminal court debt); Samantha Melamed, Why Are Pennsylvania Judges Sentencing People on Probation
for Debts They Won’t Ever Be Able to Pay?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/
philadelphia-court-judge-genece-brinkley-probation-court-costs-fines-debtors-prison-aclu-20191010.html
(describing Pennsylvania courts’ practice of jailing debtors for inability to pay criminal court costs); Wayne K.
Roustan, Florida Suspends Nearly 2 Million Driver’s Licenses. Help May Be on Way., SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 6,
2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/transportation/fl-reg-drivers-license-suspensions-2018
0208-story.html (explaining that the bulk of driver’s licenses suspended in Florida for a non-driving offence
were suspended due to nonpayment of child support and court debt); see also CARSON WHITELEMONS, ASHLEY
THOMAS & SARAH COUTURE, DRIVING ON EMPTY: FLORIDA’S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND COSTLY DRIVER’S
LICENSE SUSPENSION PRACTICES 3 (2019), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2019/11/
florida-fines-fees-drivers-license-suspension-driving-on-empty.pdf (reporting that, in 2017, Florida issued 1.1
million driver’s license suspension notices for unpaid court debt).
3. R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Bergstrom, Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects,
and Implications, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 242, 253 (2006).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. Anne Stuhldreher, Opinion, Charging Ex-Offenders ‘Administrative Fees’ Means Big Pain for the Poor
and Little Gain for Counties, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2018, 4:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/laoe-stuhldreher-administrative-fees-20180709-story.html (reporting average fees of $3,600 among those leaving
jail in California); ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA, & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 9–10 (2010) (reporting fees of up to $2,000 or more in various
states),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20ABarrier-Reentry.pdf.
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Scholars7 and advocates8 are well aware of these out-of-control fees and
their damaging collateral consequences.9 They argue that the fees violate
constitutional due process rights and protections against excessive fines, that
incarceration for nonpayment amounts to illegal debtors’ prison, and that the
fees undermine reentry and rehabilitation goals.10 Indeed, even those who
advocate fines and restitution often decry criminal justice fees as inappropriate.11
Yet, user fees in other contexts are not so terrible. Indeed, the public finance
literature is more sanguine on user-fee financing, noting that user fees can
improve public good provision by introducing market-like efficiency12—a view
largely absent from the scholarship on criminal justice fees.13 User fees provide
government with both price and usage information, allowing agencies to tailor
services to user demand and to reallocate resources to increase public
wellbeing.14 Fees can also reduce wasteful overconsumption of public goods by
7. E.g., Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal
System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1487–89 (2016); Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction:
Monetary Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 512–18 (2011); Beth A. Colgan,
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 286–90 (2014); Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving
Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1837, 1837–42 (2015); Alice Goffman, On the Run: Wanted
Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto, 74 AM. SOCIO. REV. 339, 354 (2009); ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH:
MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 27–46 (2016); Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal
Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1404–07 (2018); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 2283, 2305–08 (2018); Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day
Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 498–504 (2016).
8. See Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1024, 1030
(2016) (describing litigation efforts); The Clearinghouse, FINES AND FEES JUST. CTR.,
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/clearinghouse/?sortByDate=true (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (filter “content
type” by “litigation”) (listing civil suits and class actions targeting court fees, along with fines, bail costs, and
other legal financial obligations).
9. See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014,
4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.
10. See, e.g., The Clearinghouse, supra note 8 (listing recent court fee litigation).
11. See R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the
Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1820–28 (2015) (advocating mandatory restitution and occasional
fines, but arguing against the imposition of criminal justice user fees); Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic
Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735,
1760–66 (2015) (“The Code’s preferred position—that costs, fees, and assessments should be abolished—rests
chiefly on the premise that such financial encumbrances do not serve the goals of the sentencing system, but are
imposed for the side purpose of revenue generation.”).
12. E.g., RICHARD M. BIRD, CHARGING FOR PUBLIC SERVICES: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD IDEA 33–34, 39
(1976) (“[T]he basic rationale for introducing pricing into the public sector where possible is really the same as
that underlying Adam Smith’s famous ‘invisible hand’ doctrine, that is, to achieve an efficient allocation of
resources by having each individual choose to consume that amount he wants when offered at a price which
reflects the value . . . .”); Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 805–22 (1987).
13. But see Ruback, supra note 11, at 1820–25 (briefly considering the users fees’ efficiency benefits, but
dismissing fees as inappropriate in a criminal justice context for other reasons).
14. David G. Duff, Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 391, 398–99
(2004); BIRD, supra note 12, at 34. Moreover, user fees connect public service demand with a direct financing
mechanism, ensuring that expansion of a sought-after public service has a built-in funding mechanism. Duff,
supra, at 392 (“[I]t is only through the application of benefit taxes that an appropriate level and structure of
government activity can, at least in theory, be determined simultaneously with the means of financing it.”
(quoting BIRD, supra note 12, at 10)).
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forcing users to internalize the costs of their use.15 In the context of criminal
justice services, therefore, charging system users may cause criminal defendants
to reduce their use of the services, while also reducing the financial burden on
other taxpayers.16
This Article contributes to the growing scholarship on criminal justice fees
by reconciling these two viewpoints, using a public finance lens to uncover a
fundamental flaw in criminal justice fees. Specifically, criminal justice fees
occur outside of the market-like environment envisioned for traditional user fee
financing, making impossible the various allocative benefits that user fees are
meant to provide. This nonmarket structure arises for two reasons. First, criminal
courts and law enforcement agencies are monopolistic providers of mandatory
services. They thus have the power to decide the amount of fee-funded services
that users must consume. Moreover, in most cases, levying agencies directly
benefit from fee revenue,17 creating incentives to inflate the services provided.
Second, users’ demand for criminal justice services is nonresponsive to fee
levels—a departure from the standard, downward-sloping demand curve
contemplated in the public finance model.18 Various psychological and
structural factors underlie this nonresponsiveness,19 the result of which is that
criminal defendants are unable or unlikely to change their behavior in response
to fee levels. Consequently, consumer demand imposes no downward pressure
on criminal justice fee levels.20 Together, these two structural deficiencies
describe a nonmarket environment, quite distinct from that envisioned by public
finance fee models. The result of this structure is that these nonmarket fees are
subject to little meaningful restraint, facing no downward pressure and
significant upward pressure on fee levels.
Courts, the restrainer of last resort, have mostly abdicated responsibility to
rein in criminal court fees in many states. Over the past several decades, as fees
have expanded, courts across the country have winnowed the restrictions

15. Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 12, at 805–06, 810–11; see infra Part I.C.2.
16. Phil Willon, Riverside County to Make Inmates Pay Jail Costs, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2011-nov-20-la-me-inmate-fees-20111120-story.html (describing a
Riverside County policy of charging inmates for incarceration in county jail and quoting county officials who
describe the policy as a crime deterrent as well as a reimbursement to taxpayers).
17. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 7, at 1406 (explaining that court fees often fund the criminal justice system
broadly, or even the salaries of court employees and the daily costs of running the courthouse); Gerald R.
Wheeler, Rodney V. Hissong, Morgan P. Slusher & Therese M. Macan, Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice:
Dilemma for Human Service?, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 63, 66 (1990) (reporting that fifty percent of the Harris County
probation department general budget is derived from probation fees).
18. See infra Part I.C.1 & fig.1.
19. For instance, criminal defendants may be antisocial or naturally optimistic, either of which may cause
them to ignore various repercussions of criminal behavior. For further discussion of these psychological factors,
see infra notes 134–138. Regarding structure, because the fee amounts are set after the defendant is already
locked into the criminal justice system, those who commit infractions have difficulty considering the fee amount
when deciding how to behave. See infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.
20. For an explanation of how user demand might impose downward pressure on fees, see infra notes 110–
112 and accompanying text.
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imposed upon them.21 In many states, criminal court fees need only maintain a
superficial relationship to the broad category of services being provided.22
Worse, in the context of criminal justice fees, most courts do not question the
propriety of the services provided to payors, nor do they meaningfully restrict
the fee amounts.23
Unbounded, nonmarket criminal justice fees are inequitable and inefficient.
Unrestrained fees encourage fee-chasing behavior, leading to over-policing of
fee-funded crimes and undersupply of other services. Moreover, criminal justice
agencies face incentives to target politically powerless groups in order to reduce
the risk of political reprisal and protect their unbounded revenue stream.
Ballooning fee burdens also inflict significant human cost. Criminal defendants
and their families suffer mounting debt, bad credit, wage garnishment, and
indefinite monitoring by criminal justice systems.24 Finally, a lack of restraint is
per se problematic, denying payors meaningful protection from potentially
exploitative government exactions.
In addition to highlighting this fundamental flaw in criminal justice fees,
reconciling the public finance and criminal justice fee literatures is useful for at
least two reasons. First, this analysis provides a framework for evaluating other
potentially exploitative nonmarket fees. In furtherance of that goal, this Article
offers a list of user fee characteristics that may erode meaningful constraints.
While criminal justice fees stand out as the worst on a continuum of nonmarket
fees,25 novel fee structures are continually arising in resource-strapped cities and
counties.26 Policymakers and advocates can use the framework provided herein
to identify and prevent potentially unbounded, nonmarket fees before they
become entrenched revenue streams.
Second, the public finance lens suggests certain judicial and legislative
reforms to nonmarket fees. Perhaps most importantly, policymakers should
seriously consider whether fee-financing is appropriate where a monopolistic
agency provides mandatory services to captive payors. Fees may be patently
unsuitable in extreme nonmarket contexts like the criminal justice system. If
policymakers decide otherwise, nonmarket fees should be subject to meaningful
restraint and should not create perverse incentives for collecting agencies. To
21. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of
Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 396 (2004) (arguing that courts have provided a “convenient way for
local governments to raise general revenues” by weakening fee requirements); infra Part II.C.
22. See infra notes 161166 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Broyles v. State, 688 S.W.2d 290, 291–92
(Ark. 1985) (holding a $250 fee levied against a DUI defendant was constitutional, despite being allocated to
general programs addressing drunk driving and alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation).
23. See infra notes 156–166.
24. See infra notes 197–205 and accompanying text.
25. Other nonmarket fees on this continuum are mandatory fees that attach to real property, see Rogers v.
Oktibbeha County Bd. of Supervisors, 749 So. 2d 966, 969 (Miss. 1999) (upholding a mandatory garbage
collection fee assessed against payors who did not use the service), and fees levied against those involved in
accidents, see Christopher Jensen, A Crash. A Call for Help. Then, a Bill., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/automobiles/05CRASHTAX.html (describing fees imposed on accident
victims).
26. See Reynolds, supra note 21, at 396.
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that end, the Article briefly surveys several judicial and legislative reforms,
including increasing judicial scrutiny, prohibiting local agencies from keeping
the fee revenue they collect, and placing a low per-person cap on total fees.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes criminal court fees as
well as traditional user fees, highlighting the disharmony in the two literatures.
It also presents a simple public finance model of how fee levels are theoretically
set by government providers. Part II explains the nonmarket nature of criminal
justice fees, as well as the erosion of judicial fee doctrine. Part III details the
harms caused by unbounded, nonmarket fees. Part IV offers implications of the
public finance fee framework, comparing criminal justice fees to other
nonmarket fees and suggesting policy reforms.

I. FEES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
After briefly defining user fees, this Part describes fees levied in the criminal
justice system and surveys the literature on them. It then describes user fees as
presented in the public finance literature, explaining how fees can harness a
market-like structure to improve allocative efficiency.
A. DEFINING FEES
Fees are perhaps best understood in opposition to taxes. At a basic level, a
fee is a charge levied by a government agency in exchange for a good or service
that it provides.27 In contrast, a tax is a compulsory government levy that need
not bear any direct relationship to the government services it finances,28 and is
intended primarily to raise revenue.29 Fees are trim, funding just the service
provided to the user, while taxes are plump, funding the whole government
apparatus.30
Fees can generally be placed into two broad categories: user fees and
regulatory fees.31 User fees operate similar to a price mechanism for a private

27. Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 12, at 800.
28. DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO POLICY 21 (10th
ed. 2010), https://www.uv.mx/personal/clelanda/files/2014/09/Hyman-David-2011-Public-Finance.pdf.
29. See Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269 (Mich. 1998) (distinguishing taxes from fees,
concluding that “[a] ‘tax’ . . . is designed to raise revenue”).
30. Because a tax is compulsory, and because the total amount of government services imposes no limit
on any individual tax burden, the distribution of taxes is often scrutinized under diverse fairness criteria. Sagit
Leviner, The Normative Underpinnings of Taxation, 13 NEV. L.J. 95, 97, 130–33 (2012) (describing several
dominant normative theories of fairness in taxation, including natural entitlement, utilitarianism, and Rawlsian
maximin). These fairness criteria include ability-to-pay considerations, vertical and horizontal equity, public
benefits received, and normative principles justifying fair redistribution of income and wealth. See generally
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX
REFORM 59–67 (1996) (describing fairness principles underlying distributions of tax burdens); LIAM MURPHY &
THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 13–30 (2002) (identifying and critiquing
various tax fairness principles). In exchange for this broad fairness inquiry, taxes may fund any government
service, from individualized services such as schools or sewers, to public goods such as roads or national defense.
Taxes may also redistribute income from rich to poor households.
31. BIRD, supra note 12, at 17; Reynolds, supra note 21, at 397–402.
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good or service32: consumers pay a fee based on their usage of a public good or
service.33 U.S. Postal Service charges, public transportation fees, and utility rates
offer examples of such charges, which are also sometimes called “public
prices.”34 Regulatory fees, in contrast, are based on the government’s police
power to regulate a certain activity, often including licensing or inspection
fees.35 Such fees are meant to offset the broad costs of monitoring a regulated
activity.36 Both user fees and regulatory fees are levied in proportion to the level
of services that the payor utilizes.37
Courts have interpreted these basic principles to require that fees must bear
a direct relationship to the good or service that the government provides to the
payor.38 This relationship typically entails at least two limits: (1) The fee is
imposed only on the specific entity that receives the service or causes the
regulatory cost to government, and (2) an individual’s fee amount should not
exceed the government’s cost to provide services to that individual.39 These
limits are difficult to police in practice.40
Simple definitions such as these obscure the complexity involved in
classifying government charges, both as a legal and a theoretical matter.41 Some
may share elements of both taxes and fees, falling somewhere in the middle. For
example, benefit taxes also seek to charge the beneficiaries of a certain service.42

32. State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 741 (Haw. 1999); Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious
Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 344–45 (2002).
33. BIRD, supra note 12, at 17. In certain cases, the government might subsidize the activity to ensure
broader access. Id.
34. Id.
35. Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 741 (quoting Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass.
1984)).
36. See, e.g., Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 96 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Mich. 1959) (“To be sustained, the
[automobile licensing fee] we are here considering must be held to be one for regulation only, and not as a means
primarily of producing revenue.” (quoting Vernor v. Sec’y of State, 146 N.W. 338, 341 (Mich. 1914)). The offset
costs need not be directly related to government monitoring of the activity. See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Cal. 1997) (allowing the imposition of regulatory fees on
manufacturers of lead-containing paint, intended to offset costs associating with childhood lead poisoning).
37. Duff, supra note 14, at 393 (defining fees).
38. E.g., Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269 (Mich. 1998) (holding that, among other criteria,
“user fees must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service”); United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523
U.S. 360, 370 (1998) (holding that, under the Export Clause, a levied fee must bear some direct relationship to
the payor’s use of the government facilities); JOSEPH HENCHMAN, TAX FOUND., HOW IS THE MONEY USED?
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES DISTINGUISHING TAXES AND FEES 5 (2013), https://files.taxfoundation.org/
20190103161206/TaxesandFeesBook.pdf (“Fees are imposed for the primary purpose of covering the cost of
providing a service, with the funds raised directly from those benefiting from a particular provided service.”).
39. Spitzer, supra note 32, at 343.
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. BIRD, supra note 12, at 18.
42. Id. It is also worth mentioning special assessments, another financing instrument similar to fees, which
fund public capital improvements via mandatory property assessments. Id. at 17; Reynolds, supra note 21, at
397–402 (describing special assessments and their expanded use and changing nature over time). For example,
the cost of new sidewalks might be funded by a special assessment on all properties abutting them. Property
owners benefit directly from the improvement via increased property values and must bear a part of the cost of
providing it. BIRD, supra note 12, at 17–18; Reynolds, supra note 21, at 397. Special assessments are explored
further below. See infra Part IV.A and text accompanying notes 231–238.
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Distinct from fees, however, the amount of the tax is independent of the service
received.43 For example, while gasoline taxes may fund highway repair, gasoline
consumption is merely a proxy for road use, not a direct measure.
It is especially important to distinguish fees from fines.44 Although there is
some conceptual overlap—fees and fines might both seek to deter bad behavior,
for example45—fees seek primarily to recoup the cost of government activity
while fines seek to punish offenders.46 Any deterrent caused by fees should
occur mainly via users internalizing the full social cost of their activities, as
discussed below. A fine should also bear some proportionate relationship to the
severity of the offense—that is, a fine for speeding should not exceed a fine for
murder.47 The same limitation does not apply to fees.48 Because of these
differences, fines must be evaluated separately from fees when determining
proper fiscal burdens. Considering the propriety of fines is beyond the scope of
this Article.
In this Article, “fee” refers to a government charge that bears a direct
relationship to a service provided to an identifiable and separable beneficiary.49
It includes any criminal justice charge imposed on system users—whether found
guilty or not—that seeks to reimburse government for the cost of running the
criminal justice system. Such charges may cover the cost of a specific criminal
justice service, or the general cost of running the system. Although some fees
might bear different labels, such as “costs” or “surcharges,” this Article does not
distinguish based on such labels.50 Using these terms interchangeably is standard

43. BIRD, supra note 12, at 18.
44. Scholarship on the topic often places fines, fees, and restitution into one catch-all category of legal
financial obligations (LFOs). See Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The
Case of Legal Financial Obligations, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 310 (2017).
45. See infra Part I.C.2.
46. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 249 (explaining that costs and fees “seek reparations for society
as a victim (and, in particular, the court system) and require offenders to pay substantial (and increasing) amounts
in an effort to hold them accountable for their actions”).
47. See Magna Carta 1225, 9 Hen. 3 c. 14 (Eng.); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019)
(acknowledging the “fundamental nature” of the right to proportionate fines); CESARE BONESANA DI BECCARIA,
AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 32 (W.C. Little & Co., 1872) (1764) (“If an equal punishment be
ordained for two crimes that injure society in different degrees, there is nothing to deter men from committing
the greater, as often as it is attended with greater advantage.”).
48. Indeed, fees for minor offenses very often exceed those for more serious offenses. See Alexes Harris,
Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Courtesy Stigma and Monetary Sanctions: Toward a Socio-Cultural Theory
of Punishment, 115 AM. SOCIO. REV. 234, 253–54 (2011).
49. Importantly, this Article does not take the position that criminal justice fees are actually taxes in
disguise. Although the fees are distinct from traditional user fees for their compulsory nature, they are not levied
on the general population, nor are they typically intended to raise general revenue. Rather, in most cases criminal
justice fees are levied on users of the criminal justice system and bear some relationship, however tenuous, to
the general service being provided.
50. In some places, for example, a cost might look backwards to the actual costs of prosecution, while a
fee might look forward to future expenses, such as supervision. Ruback, supra note 11, at 1804.
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practice in many jurisdictions’ statutes and ordinances, as well as scholarly
articles, advocacy reports, and the Model Penal Code.51
B. CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES
Criminal justice fees are intended to reimburse the government for the cost
of prosecuting, incarcerating, and monitoring an individual who has been
accused and perhaps convicted of a crime.52 They began to proliferate in the
1970s and 1980s,53 and since then have exploded in size and scope.54 Courts,
police departments, and carceral and monitoring agencies have embraced fees
in response to budget shortfalls,55 particularly in places where increasing taxes
is difficult or impossible due to legal and political restraints.56
Fees vary widely by state and county.57 In the vast majority of instances,
judges, police officers, prison officials, and others involved in the criminal
justice system decide what services a user will receive and thus the total fee
amount borne by each individual.58 Such fees might cover, for example, the cost
of operating court-diversion programs, prosecution costs, DNA analysis,
probation supervision, electronic monitoring devices, juries and witnesses,
warrants, and so forth.59 Even defendants found innocent may in some cases

51. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 253; Ruback, supra note 11, at 1803–04 (explaining the
difference between the label of cost versus fee, but noting that “the terms are often used interchangeably,”
including in the Model Penal Code).
52. See Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 253; Ruback, supra note 11, at 1803–04.
53. See Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the Case for Fines, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 547, 551 (2010);
CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT COSTS: FEES, MISCELLANEOUS CHARGES
AND SURCHARGES AND A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PRACTICE 4–7 (1986), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/
collection/financial/id/81/ (noting an increase in the use of court fees and charges in the 1980s, setting standards
for their administration).
54. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 9 (finding that forty-eight states had increased civil and criminal court fees
between 2010 and 2014).
55. See U.S. DEP ’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2, 9–15
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report.pdf; CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, POSITION PAPER ON STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH
BUDGETS IN TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 13–14 (2003), https://cosca.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/23366/
budgetwhitepaper.pdf (encouraging resource-strapped courts to utilize fee revenue under certain circumstances,
but cautioning that courts must protect against being seen as a “pay as you go enterprise”).
56. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST PEOPLE OF COLOR: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 9 (2017), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_
Report2017.pdf (citing Missouri’s Hancock Amendment as an example of a tax limiting policy that hamstrings
municipal governments); CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, supra note 53, at 4 (explaining that courts have come
to rely on fee revenue in part because such revenue is exempted from voter approval requirements in state
constitutions).
57. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 27.
58. Id.
59. Id.; Ruback, supra note 11, at 1804. Some jurisdictions charge up to the full cost of prosecuting a case.
E.g., 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-21-20(a) (West 2020) (“If, upon any complaint or prosecution before any
court, the defendant shall be ordered to pay a fine, enter into a recognizance or suffer any penalty or forfeiture,
he or she shall also be ordered to pay all costs of prosecution, unless directed otherwise by law.”); MISS. CODE.
ANN. § 99-19-77 (West 2019).
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continue to be liable for fees.60 Moreover, these fees are typically not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.61
The total fee burden for an individual will rise over time as she inhabits a
system over which she has little control. Fees begin accruing at arrest and
continue throughout the prosecution process. For example, in thirty-six states,
defendants must bear fees for public defender services required under federal
law.62 Defendants may also bear the cost of monitoring or jail time before and
during adjudication, with fees in some places exceeding $100 per day.63 Judges
and others involved in the process can tack on additional charges throughout
adjudication, varying from a few dollars to hundreds of dollars or more.64 One
representative criminal court docket from a drug crime adjudication in
Pennsylvania lists twenty-six different fees ranging from $2 to $345.65 The fee
balance in that case totaled nearly $2,500—five times the $500 fine and seven
times the $345 restitution charge.66
Fees continue to accrue after conviction, applying to incarceration and postincarceration monitoring. A study by the City and County of San Francisco
found that California localities could assess up to thirty different fees on an
individual exiting the criminal justice system.67 Some states allow prisons to
levy fixed charges on inmates, for example, of $50 per day.68 Other states allow
sentencing judges to charge inmates a variable cost for confinement.69 Some also

60. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.9(6) (West 2020) (providing rules for public defense fees applicable
to acquitted defendants); State v. Haas, 927 A.2d 1209, 1210 (2007) (stating that “[t]here is nothing illegitimate
in the governmental interest in recouping costs expended for public defense whether or not the defendant is
convicted,” and citing several jurisdictions that have held the same); Ava Kofman, Digital Jail: How Electronic
Monitoring Drives Defendants into Debt, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/
magazine/digital-jail-surveillance.html (describing fees for pre-trial ankle monitors, which defendants must pay
even if found innocent).
61. See In re Sanders, 589 B.R. 874, 881 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2018) (broadly interpreting 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(7) to include all costs imposed during criminal proceedings).
62. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 28–41 tbl.2.4.
63. Id. at 45 (providing that local jails in Washington state are allowed to charge $100 per day); Willon,
supra note 16; Kofman, supra note 60.
64. BANNON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. FIN. JUST. PROJECT, OFF. OF TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR, CITY & CNTY. OF S.F., CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATIVE FEES: HIGH PAIN FOR PEOPLE, LOW GAIN FOR GOVERNMENT 1 (2018), https://sftreasurer.org/
high-pain-low-gain.
68. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 45 (explaining that facilities in Marion County, Florida, and Washington state
charge inmates $50 per day, while Kentucky caps rates at $40 per day); LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, BRENNAN C TR.
FOR JUST., CHARGING INMATES PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION 3 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/blog/Charging_Inmates_Mass_Incarceration.pdf (providing survey data showing that daily
jail fees can run as high as $70 per day). This Article sets aside the issue of filing fees under the Prison Reform
Litigation Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (denying prisoners the option to file a civil court action in forma pauperis
(without fees) and laying out a fee schedule for incarcerated plaintiffs in civil actions). It is worth considering
whether filing a civil action to vindicate one’s rights is truly optional, but such consideration is beyond the scope
of this Article.
69. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 45.
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allow jails and prisons—which are often run by private companies70—to charge
inmates for the cost of room and board, medical services, and clothing.71 Note
that these are in addition to court fees accrued during adjudication.
Probation services operate similarly, charging fees for various courtmandated supervision services, such as ankle-monitors, drug tests, and
counseling services.72 Monitoring fees can amount to several hundred dollars
per month.73 For instance, Alabama law allows monitoring fees up to 25% of a
parolee’s gross weekly pay.74 Moreover, probation supervisors, who are also
often privately employed, may tack on their own fees, such as late payment
fees.75 Where a private company provides such services, government bodies
often exert little oversight of fee-setting decisions.76
This panoply of fees results in significant financial burdens. Researchers in
California found that the three most common criminal justice fees in the state
impose an average debt of $3,600 on those leaving jail.77 Studies in Alabama
and Texas found fees commonly totaling around $2,000.78 Notably, and distinct
from fines, criminal justice fee amounts are independent from the severity of the
underlying offense.79 Indeed, although fines and fees often go together, fees
typically far outstrip fines.80 According to one study in Pennsylvania, out of
approximately 2,600 different economic sanctions used in the state, nearly 2,400
70. A report from the Office of the Inspector General noted that twelve percent of the Federal Bureau of
Prison’s inmate population were housed in private facilities in 2015. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF INSPECTOR
GEN., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS at i (2016),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf. Federal statistics do not provide information on local or state
facilities. As merely one example, the private prison company CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of
America) lists several municipal facilities on its website. Find a Facility, CORECIVIC,
http://www.corecivic.com/facilities (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (listing all facilities, including many that contract
with counties and other municipalities); see also Jessica Boehm, Mesa Will Be the First Arizona City with Private
Jail, AZCENTRAL.COM (May 22, 2017, 9:05 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/mesa/2017/05/
23/mesa-first-arizona-city-private-jail-corecivic/337197001/ (describing Mesa City Council decision to contract
for municipal jail services with CoreCivic and highlighting community concerns).
71. See, e.g., Is Charging Inmates to Stay in Prison Smart Policy?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 9,
2019), http://www.brennancenter.org/states-pay-stay-charges (providing pay-to-stay rules by state); HARRIS,
supra note 7, at 45 (describing variations in incarceration fee statutes).
72. BANNON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–8; Kofman, supra note 60.
73. EISEN, supra note 68, at 2.
74. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 46.
75. HUM. RTS. WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION
INDUSTRY 55–67 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf (detailing
the significant discretion granted to private probation companies to decide fees).
76. Id. (describing the lack of court or state government oversight mechanisms for private probation
services). See generally BRIAN HIGHSMITH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., COMMERCIALIZED (IN )JUSTICE:
CONSUMER ABUSES IN THE BAIL AND CORRECTIONS INDUSTRY (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
criminal-justice/report-commercialized-injustice.pdf (detailing the involvement of private companies
throughout bail and corrections programs).
77. Stuhldreher, supra note 6 (urging Los Angeles to follow San Francisco’s footsteps in reducing criminal
justice fee debt).
78. Meredith & Morse, supra note 44, at 311; BANNON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
79. Harris et al., supra note 48, at 253–54 (finding that drug offenses in Washington state courts bore higher
financial penalties than violent crimes).
80. R. Barry Ruback & Valerie A. Clark, Reduce Disparity in Economic Sanctions, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN CRIMINAL J USTICE POLICY 75, 78 (Natasha Frost, Joshua D. Freilich & Todd R. Clear eds., 2009).
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were fees and only about 80 were fines.81 The Pennsylvania case described
above triggered a fee burden that, at $2,500, was five times the $500 fine.82 In
California, fees of $390 to $715 may attach to a $100 traffic fine.83
Some fees may attach to actions that are not typically considered criminal
or, if technically criminal, are rather innocuous in nature. These actions might
include parking tickets and “fix-it” tickets, loitering citations, or violation of
nuisance rules and other civil code ordinances. In one extreme example,
residents of Indio and Coachella who committed minor infractions—such as
owning chickens or failing to obtain proper building permits—received
exorbitant bills for the cost of their prosecution ranging from $2,700 to
$31,000.84 However, while prosecution fees are not uncommon, they rarely
attach to such minor infractions that are typically civil in nature.85
The “criminalization of poverty” plays a role here as well. The term refers
to the illegalization of certain actions that are more likely to be committed by
the poor.86 Such actions might include truancy of school children (for which
parents are held accountable);87 driving with an expired license; sleeping, eating,
and sitting in public spaces; and late payment of other fees.88 As with other
criminal prosecution, being charged with any of these infractions will carry
associated fees, typically independent of the financial condition of the
offender.89 Worse, nonpayment can result in incarceration, triggering the
spiraling carceral and monitoring fees described above.90

81. Id.
82. BANNON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
83. W. CTR. ON L. & POVERTY, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE
INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 9–10 (2015), https://wclp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Not-Just-a-FergusonProblem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California.pdf.
84. Brett Kelman, They Confessed to Minor Crimes. Then City Hall Billed Them $122K in “Prosecution
Fees,” DESERT SUN, https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/crime_courts/2017/11/15/he-confessed-minorcrime-then-city-hall-billed-him-31-k-his-own-prosecution/846850001/ (Apr. 26, 2018).
85. Id. (explaining that nuisance property violations can be civil or criminal in nature). Notably, the
prosecution fees in this case were levied by a private law firm, to which the city had outsourced its ordinance
prosecution activity. Id. Shortly after contracting with the private firm, the cities involved passed ordinances
freeing such fees from judge approval in criminal cases. Id.
86. See Peter Edelman, Opinion, How It Became a Crime to Be Poor in America, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2017,
8:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/06/how-poverty-became-crime-america
(describing the “criminalization of poverty” as a “set of criminal justice strategies that punish poor people for
their poverty” by punishing certain behaviors connected with poverty, such as homelessness or calling 911 for
domestic abuse, and shifting the cost of their adjudication onto system users, many of whom cannot afford to
pay).
87. Children deemed “truant” are often merely late, for example, due to over-crowded public
transportation. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Opinion, Is It Now a Crime to Be Poor?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/opinion/09ehrenreich.html.
88. KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING
SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 5 (2015), https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPSThe-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf.
89. Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-to-Pay Determinations Are Inadequate to Transform
a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 186–87 (2019) (detailing
shortcomings and nonenforcement of ability-to-pay determinations for criminal justice obligations).
90. Pyke, supra note 1 (describing one such case related to truancy).
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Regardless of the entry point, once involved in the system, users have no
control over the amount of fees they will ultimately accrue.91 Police, courts,
prisons, and probation agencies mandate the various services consumed during
arrest, adjudication, incarceration, and post-incarceration monitoring. Although
in some cases a criminal defendant can choose among alternatives—such as
pleading guilty or going to trial92—generally a defendant cannot refuse a
required service or choose a different service provider.
Scholars and advocates have noted the out-of-control fees in the criminal
justice system and have devoted significant attention to fighting them.93 In fact,
there is surprising consensus on the terribleness of criminal justice fees. Even
those who support the use of fines and restitution decry criminal justice fees as
ineffective and inappropriate.94 The reasons for this outrage are myriad. Some
argue that these financial obligations lead to abusive collection practices,
undermine reentry efforts, and strain poor communities.95 Others focus on the
collateral consequences of nonpayment, such as incarceration, which advocates
have labeled debtors’ prison.96 Yet others argue that these fees violate

91. Moreover, given the realities of incarceration and reentry, such fees are often borne by the incarcerated
individuals’ family members. EISEN, supra note 68, at 4. Thus, if the goal is to ensure that guilty persons bear
the cost of their own misdeeds, this may not be happening.
92. Given the well-documented flaws with plea bargaining, the freedom of such a choice is highly suspect.
E.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“[Plea bargaining] is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system.” (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))); see also Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept.
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ (“This is the
age of the plea bargain. Most people adjudicated in the criminal-justice system today waive the right to a trial
and the host of protections that go along with one, including the right to appeal. Instead, they plead guilty.”).
93. Scholarship on criminal justice debt tends to lump together fines, fees, and restitution, or LFOs. See
Meredith & Morse, supra note 44, at 312.
94. See Ruback, supra note 11, at 1820–28 (advocating abolition of criminal justice user fees); Reitz, supra
note 11, at 1760–66 (describing the Model Penal Code’s abolitionist position on criminal justice fees).
95. See, e.g., Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 519 (arguing that fines and fees are too large, arbitrary,
and impede reentry); Goffman, supra note 7, at 354 (exploring negative social ramifications of criminal justice
fees, among other forms of social control); Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood
from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1777
(2010) (finding that LFOs reduce household income, limit access to opportunities and resources, and increase
the likelihood of ongoing criminal justice involvement); Sobol, supra note 7, at 511–16 (focusing on abusive
debt collection practices). Another line of research examines the factors that may determine LFO burdens. See,
e.g., David E. Olson & Gerard F. Ramker, Crime Does Not Pay, but Criminals May: Factors Influencing the
Imposition and Collection of Probation Fees, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 29, 33–36, 41–43 (2001).
96. E.g., REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL
JUSTICE FEES 14 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_The%20HiddenCosts-Florida%27s-Criminal-Justice-Fees.pdf (documenting problematic criminal justice fees in Florida); Peter
Edelman, The Criminalization of Poverty and the People Who Fight Back, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
213, 218–19 (2019) (describing how states profit from criminal justice debt repeatedly imposed on minor
infractions); DOUGLAS N. EVANS, RSCH. & EVALUATION CTR., JOHN J AY COLL. OF CRIM. JUST., THE DEBT
PENALTY: EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 9 (2014), https://jjrec.files.
wordpress.com/2014/08/debtpenalty.pdf; Katherine Beckett & Naomi Murakawa, Mapping the Shadow
Carceral State: Toward an Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY
221, 227–29 (2012) (mapping the many ways a criminal defendant can be incarcerated for failure to pay LFOs);
Traci R. Burch, Fixing the Broken System of Financial Sanctions, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 539, 555
(2011) (suggesting policy reforms for out-of-control criminal justice debt); State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons,
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constitutional protections, such as due process and equal protection rights.97
Closer to the arguments made herein, some scholars highlight the perverse
incentives faced by agents of the criminal justice system, exploring how such
incentives lead to over-policing and over-punishment.98 Litigants have argued
the same, implicating constitutional concerns.99 For example, the plaintiff in
Bice v. Louisiana Public Defender Board argued that a $35 public defender fee
levied only on guilty defendants discouraged his counsel from seeking
exoneration, violating due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.100
This Article contributes to this body of research and advocacy, but it sets
aside collateral consequences and constitutional concerns, which are being ably
explored elsewhere. Instead, the Article spotlights the fee-setting structure itself,
the incentives and nonmarket conditions underlying such a structure, and the
inefficiencies and inequities that it creates.
C. FEES IN THE PUBLIC FINANCE LITERATURE
The public finance literature departs drastically from criminal justice
scholarship in its stance on user-fee financing, often celebrating fees as
convenient fiscal devices. This Subpart explores this public finance perspective,
describing how fees are thought to improve allocative efficiency.101
supra note 8, at 1034–43 (describing states’ longstanding bans on debtor’s prisons, and modern enforcement
efforts).
97. See, e.g., John D. King, Privatizing Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. 561, 587–92 (2019) (arguing
that LFOs degrade fundamental rights to adequate criminal defense and jury trial); Barack Obama, Commentary,
The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 843–44 (2017)
(“[E]xcessive fines and fees . . . deprive our fellow Americans of their fundamental rights, and have too often
led to a two-tiered system in which the poor are not accorded the equal protection under the laws to which they
are entitled under the U.S. Constitution.”).
98. See Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175,
1178 (2014) (highlighting a basic concern with user fees, noted by various courts, that such fees “will corrode
the neutrality of government officials and others, who feel the gravitational pull of money as they resolve cases
and process offenders”); Smith, supra note 7, at 2313–20 (noting that civil rights claimants have argued that
court fees incentivize findings of guilt).
99. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927) (holding that subjecting a defendant to a trial before a local judge and village mayor, with a
“direct . . . pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant” violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 65 (1928) (holding that mayor with a fixed salary and limited
executive authority did not violate Due Process rights when the mayor acted as a judge).
100. Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 714–15 (5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit dismissed the
complaint. Id. at 720.
101. Under certain distributive justice paradigms, fees may also improve a system’s fairness. Specifically,
fees embody the idea that payors should only bear the cost of a public good or service to the extent they benefit
from it, a concept known as the benefit principle. BIRD, supra note 12, at 11 (“[T]he benefit principle rests on
the commercial principle that it is only fair to pay for what you get.”). User fees may also be considered fair
under an entitlement-based theory of distributive justice, such as libertarianism. Indeed, user fees may be the
only legitimate government charge under such a normative framework. An entitlement theory of distributive
justice rejects any patterned distribution of resources as a violation of individuals’ property rights. Instead,
legitimate transfers require the consent of the property holder. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
160–64 (2d ed. 2013). Funding an entire government system via voluntary fee payments would better realize an
entitlement system of justice, compared to one financed by compulsory taxes.
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1. Market-Like Pricing
Traditional fee structures approximate a private market. Oversimplified,
agencies set fees using something akin to a price mechanism, which is based in
part on the marginal cost of services provided as well as consumer demand.102
This quasi-market structure is largely what distinguishes fees from taxes and
also what generates the efficiency benefits that fees are thought to provide.103
Importantly, if operating as expected, the presence of user demand may exert
downward pressure on fee levels.
A (very) brief explanation of market forces helps to lay the foundation for
such reasoning. As a definitional matter, an efficient market is one in which
scarce resources flow to the party willing to pay the highest price for them.104
Assuming that willingness-to-pay reflects the value a person derives from a good
or service, an efficient system should thus maximize wellbeing.105 In the context
of fees, efficient allocation occurs where the price charged for a public good or
service equals its marginal cost of production. Figure 1 illustrates this concept.
Of course, it is important to note that government balances many goals alongside
efficiency, including preservation of scarce resources, equal access, subsidizing
desirable behavior, and so forth.
In Figure 1, p represents the price charged for a public good or service; D
represents user demand, which is decreasing as the price (fee) increases; and MC
represents the marginal cost of producing one additional unit of the public good
or service. The marginal cost curve is flat for the sake of simplicity. At p = MC,
economic efficiency is achieved.106 In plain speak, this means that users are
consuming the good up to the point where the value they derive from the good
is exactly equal to the cost to produce it. If p < MC, the cost to produce the good
exceeds the price that users are willing to pay. This means that scarce resources
are over-allocated to production of the public good, and that efficiency and
wellbeing would improve if they were reallocated elsewhere. If p > MC, users
are willing to pay more than the cost of production, implying that resources
should be reallocated to increase production of the public good.

102. Of course, other factors will hugely affect government pricing, including market failures such as
negative externalities, policy goals such as a desire to incentivize specific behavior, and other nonmarket factors.
103. Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 12, at 805–22; ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS.,
SR-6, LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION: USER CHARGES 27–34 (1987), https://library.unt.edu/gpo/
acir/reports/staff/SR-6.pdf.
104. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 145–47 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining market
efficiency).
105. Id. at 136–45 (describing consumer and producer surplus as imperfect measures of market actors’
wellbeing).
106. RICHARD M. BIRD & ENID SLACK, 110TH ANN. CONF. OF THE NAT’L T AX ASS’N, FINANCING
INFRASTRUCTURE: WHO SHOULD PAY? 2 (2017), https://www.ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads/proceedings/
2017/NTA2017-378.pdf (“[W]hen user charges for services fully cover the marginal social cost of providing
them, people buy such services only up to the point at which the value they receive from the last unit they
consume is just equal to the price they pay, so that resources are more efficiently allocated.”).
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To see how fees are thought to increase allocative efficiency, consider
instead a public good funded by taxes and offered at no charge to users, such as
a road. If offered for free, then p = 0. In Figure 1, at p = 0, the fee is significantly
lower than marginal cost, implying that many users are willing to pay far less
for the road than the actual cost to provide and maintain it. Allocating this level
of resources to road production is inefficient, as resources could be expended on
goods and services that users value more. That is, without a price mechanism,
users will overconsume and government will overprovide roads.
Fees correct for this inefficiency by harnessing market forces to influence
both user demand and government supply.107 By charging a fee equal to pe, all
users who value a public good less than pe will forego its use, thereby reducing
wasteful overconsumption.108 This is the demand curve at work. On the supply
side, government can respond to price and demand information by reducing or
increasing supply accordingly.109 Moreover, by offering a public good in
exchange for a fee, the government can determine demand at specific prices. It
can then expand public services only when system users are willing to pay for
the cost of expansion.110 Armed with this information, the government can
107. Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional
Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 933 (2003); Reynolds, supra note 21, at 388–89 (listing reasons why local
governments might choose to impose a fee).
108. Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 12, at 805–06, 810–11.
109. Duff, supra note 14, at 398–99. Moreover, user fees connect public service demand with a direct
financing mechanism, ensuring that expansion of a sought-after public service has a built-in funding mechanism.
Id. at 392 (“[I]t is only through the application of benefit taxes that an appropriate level and structure of
government activity can, at least in theory, be determined simultaneously with the means of financing it.”
(quoting BIRD, supra note 12, at 10)).
110. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., supra note 103, at 3; Bird & Slack, supra note
106, at 2.
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ensure an efficient level and mix of public goods, one that allocates scarce
public resources to their most efficient use.
A hypothetical fee example will help to further clarify a key intuition offered
by the graph, which is relevant to the argument in Part II. Imagine that a city
parks department offers public dog walking services for a fee. Dog owners are
willing to pay varying prices for city dog walkers, with the number of willing
users increasing as the price drops. This describes a standard downward-sloping
demand curve. The city decides to set the hourly fee equal to the marginal cost
of the service, say, $10 per hour. This amount might include the dog walker’s
time, transportation, supplies, and administrative costs. Everyone who does not
value the dog walking at least $10 per hour will not pay for the service.
Imagine now that the parks department decides to increase the dog-walking
fee above marginal cost in order to raise additional revenue—perhaps to make
up for declining tax revenue. City dog walking now costs $20 per hour. In
response, dog owners will reduce their use of the service.111 If demand falls
enough, the city may find that it earns less total revenue after the price
increase.112 The parks department may respond by reallocating personnel and
supplies to other, higher-valued uses. If it cannot do this—say, for example, it
employs a fixed labor force of dog walkers with strong employment
protections—the department may be better off reducing the price below $20, in
order to increase demand for dog walking and perhaps raise greater total
revenue. It is this basic logic that underlies the argument made in Part II: For
traditional fees that operate in a quasi-market environment, users can reduce
consumption of the government service in response to fee increases, which may
exert downward price pressure on fees.
Importantly, users’ aggregate ability to reduce quantity consumed will
depend on each individual’s ability to reduce or stop their use of dog walking
services. That is, users must be able to forego the levied service in order to exert
restraint on fee levels. Further, in order for the dog walking fee to affect
consumers’ decisions, users must know the fee amount before deciding whether
to use the service. This elementary logic is fundamental to the downward slope
of the demand curve, and is assumed in any market-based model.
2. Negative Externalities
Factors other than supply and demand will affect fee levels. Importantly,
government may levy fees greater than marginal cost in order to deter bad
behavior, by forcing consumers to internalize the cost of negative
externalities.113 A negative externality occurs where an activity causes social

111. See MANKIW, supra note 104, at 77–78 (explaining how demand responds to price increases).
112. How much demand drops will depend on the price elasticity of demand. See infra notes 116–117 and
accompanying text.
113. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 12, at 803–04 (describing how government intervention can
ameliorate inefficiencies caused by externalities); Erin Adele Scharff, Green Fees: The Challenge of Pricing
Externalities Under State Law, 97 NEB. L. REV. 168, 195–96 (2018) (describing Pigouvian pricing as a
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harm above and beyond any benefit or harm that accrues to the individual user.
For example, a polluting factory imposes additional costs on society in the form
of environmental damage and public health degradation, over and above any
costs or benefits accruing to the factory. In deciding whether or not to undertake
such an activity, a self-interested actor will not consider these external social
costs. In theory, a fee can utilize a price mechanism to ascribe a cost to these
activities, such that users will consider them when deciding the level of polluting
activity to undertake.114 Pricing such externalities requires setting the fee price
above the direct cost to government of providing any associated services.115
Thus, negative externalities impose upward pressure on fee levels, up to the
marginal social cost of the user’s bad behavior.
A fee’s efficacy in reducing unwanted behavior depends on several factors,
the most important of which is the payors’ price elasticity of demand.116
Elasticity describes how responsive users are to price changes.117 A price
increase will more effectively reduce consumption of a good or service if
demand is very elastic—that is, highly responsive to price changes. If user
demand is entirely inelastic—or, nonresponsive to price changes—increasing
the cost of an activity will not change user behavior. Price elasticity, in turn,
depends on various factors, one of which is consumers’ ability to adjust behavior
in response to prices. Again, knowledge of the price prior to consumption is a
prerequisite of this decision-making ability.
Bringing together both points, the public finance literature envisions user
fees applying in a market-like environment in which the government provides a
public good or service in exchange for a fee. A downward-sloping demand curve
is a crucial element of the efficiency-improving fee model.118 It represents users’
ability to reduce consumption in response to the fee amount. This user ability
works to limit the fee amount that a government would reasonably charge. It
also enables fees to reduce inefficient overconsumption of public goods.
To briefly summarize, the public finance literature tells us that user fees will
introduce market-like efficiency to public good provision. Meanwhile, criminal
justice scholars note that criminal justice fees have run amok, resulting in a host
of problems implicating civil rights and constitutional concerns. How can we
reconcile these two literatures? The next Part argues that it is precisely because
mechanism to impose societal costs of undesirable activities on fee payors). See generally MANKIW, supra note
104, at 198–99 (explaining negative externalities).
114. Scharff, supra note 113, at 195–96.
115. Where a government service carries positive externalities—that is, it engenders social benefits above
those conferred on the individual user—a user fee runs the risk of causing inefficient underuse. The government
may prefer to subsidize such services.
116. See MANKIW, supra note 104, at 125–27 (describing how elasticity affects tax incidence); Gillette &
Hopkins, supra note 12, at 811–12 (exploring the effects of elasticity on user fee efficiency effects, in the case
of positive externalities).
117. MANKIW, supra note 104, at 125–27.
118. E.g., Duff, supra note 14, at 398 n.30 (“The assumption of a decreasing demand for the publicly
provided good or service as its price increases . . . is crucial to the efficiency argument for benefit taxes and user
fees, since these levies have little or no effect on the quantity of the good or service provided where demand for
it is inelastic.”).
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they diverge from the traditional market-like structure that criminal justice fees
have become so problematic.

II. NONMARKET CRIMINAL FEES
Many traditional fees operate in a quasi-market environment in which users
can reduce consumption in response to the fee level. This user agency imposes
certain structural limits on fee levels, and in doing so also improves allocative
efficiency. In contrast, as this Part will argue, criminal justice fees operate in a
nonmarket environment, a fundamental structural flaw that makes traditional fee
benefits impossible in the criminal justice system. Moreover, in combination
with weakened judicial fee requirements, the nonmarket nature of these fees
means that they operate without meaningful restraint.
Two characteristics of criminal court fees cause them to differ structurally
from traditional fees and lead to their unbounded nature. First, the government
is a monopolistic provider of a mandatory service. Once locked into the system,
a user cannot refuse the service provided if the fee is unreasonable or unpayable.
This obviates the role of consumer demand and incentivizes government
agencies to engage in fee-seeking behavior. Second, for various structural and
psychological reasons, users are largely unable to respond to high fees by
changing their behavior ex-ante. The result of both features is akin to a market
with inelastic demand, but notably different because the government provider
determines the level of service consumption.119 Together, these two factors
create a nonmarket environment in which levying agencies have the power and
incentive to increase fee revenue, and which lacks the modulating influence of
downward-sloping consumer demand. This Part describes these two factors and
also explains how courts have diluted legal requirements to accommodate novel
nonmarket fee structures.
A. MANDATORY SERVICES FROM MONOPOLISTIC AGENCIES
Unlike a normal market, the consumption of criminal justice services is
primarily decided by the government agency providing the service. This occurs
because the administering agencies are monopolistic providers of mandatory
services. These agencies, in turn, directly benefit from the collected fee
revenue.120 They thus have both the power and incentive to pursue increased fee
revenue at the expense of system users. The result is upward pressure on criminal
justice fees.

119. A perfectly inelastic demand curve is represented by a vertical line in a demand graph, where the
quantity consumed is the same regardless of the price. MANKIW, supra note 104, at 92–93. However, where the
quantity consumed is partly determined by the government supplier, the demand curve might actually be upward
sloping. That is, an increase in the price/fee might increase the quantity of services consumed.
120. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 7, at 1406 (explaining that court fees often fund the criminal justice system
broadly, or even the salaries of court employees and the daily costs of running the courthouse); Wheeler et al.,
supra note 17, at 66 (reporting that fifty percent of the Harris County probation department general budget is
derived from probation fees).
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While many government agencies are monopoly service providers, the
mandatory nature of fee-funded criminal justice services is unique and
significant. A criminal defendant cannot choose a different court, prison, or
probation supervisor, nor can she opt out. Users are stuck with the services
provided, the scope of which is determined by judges, prison officers, probation
supervisors, and others involved in the carceral process.121 The user has little
power to reduce consumption of such services, regardless of the fee amount. Of
course, this is inevitable in a criminal justice context, since the services make up
a punitive criminal sentence.
More difficult to establish is whether criminal justice agency employees
actually face incentives to increase agency budgets. Public choice scholarship,
in particular the budget-maximizing model developed by William Niskanen,
suggests that such incentives do exist.122 In influential work on the subject,
Niskanen posits that agency employees may face incentives to increase agency
budgets in order to increase salaries, job security, professional power, and so
forth.123 There is some research supporting this claim for high-level bureaucrats
at state and national agencies, finding that such bureaucrats consistently believe
that their agency budgets should be expanded.124 For local law enforcement
agencies, the connection between budgets and employees’ personal wellbeing
may be even more direct than it is at larger state and federal agencies, suggesting
a greater likelihood of budget-increasing incentives.125

121. While defendants may have some choice over certain aspects of the adjudicatory process—for example,
whether to plead guilty or go to trial—both choices may carry significant fees beyond their control. For example,
programs offered as alternatives to trial, such as pre-trial diversionary programs, may accrue significant fees for
monitoring services. See Logan & Wright, supra note 98, at 1187–88 (describing the various fees that accrue to
trial alternatives).
122. See William A. Niskanen, Nonmarket Decision Making: The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 293, 293–303 (1968); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 54 (1971). But see André Blais & Stéphane Dion, Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The
Niskanen Model & Its Critics, 22 POLITY 655 passim (1990) (listing critiques of the Niskanen model).
123. See Niskanen, supra note 122, at 293–94. Where an agency operates via budget appropriations and has
full control over output, increasing output will increase costs and enable the agency to request a larger budget
appropriation. Id. at 294–96. A properly structured user fee should partly mitigate such government profligacy
by introducing market-like constraints. Id. at 300–01 (explaining that the model suggests “that a bureau operating
in a highly competitive output market would be relatively efficient”).
124. Blais & Dion, supra note 122, at 663 (surveying scarce empirical research on Niskanen’s budgetmaximizing model, concluding that the few studies available “tend to vindicate the model”); Lance T. LeLoup
& William B. Moreland, Agency Strategies and Executive Review: The Hidden Politics of Budgeting, 38 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 232, 234 (1978) (finding an average budget increase request of 41% among thirty-six agencies
within the U.S. Department of Agriculture); Lee Sigelman, The Bureaucrat as Budget Maximizer: An
Assumption Examined, 6 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 50, 56 (1986) (surveying high-level state administrators from
1964–1978, finding that between 64% and 81% believe in some level of agency expansion).
125. In one example, court fees in Louisiana were deposited into a “judicial expense fund,” over which
judges had full control. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, HARV. L. SCH., CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT:
A GUIDE FOR POLICY REFORM 7 (2016), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/confrontingcriminal-justice-debt-3.pdf. The fund was used to purchase judges’ supplemental health insurance, two Ford
Expeditions, personal vehicle upgrades, and a full-time private chef. Id. Many other examples involve private
companies that provide probation and other criminal justice services, which are entirely funded by fee revenue.
Id. at 10–11.

538

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:517

Accepting that a budget-increasing incentive exists to some degree,
monopolistic criminal justice agencies have the power to satisfy it by pursuing
fee revenue. Indeed, agency employees have more control over fee revenue than
over budget appropriations. They can increase fee revenue by directly increasing
the fee level or by increasing the quantity of services provided. Increasing
quantity may mean increasing aggregate quantity—that is, total citations or
arrests126—or increasing services imposed on individual defendants—for
example, by mandating additional carceral services or increased monitoring.127
There is evidence of both, described further below.128
We also might expect a revenue-seeking agency to act to reduce the
likelihood of political restraint, for example, targeting politically powerless or
unpopular groups.129 Criminal defendants, disliked and disenfranchised, are an
ideal target. Because voters and policymakers may feel that these unpopular
groups ought to bear a higher cost for using public services, political intervention
on behalf of payors is unlikely. The poor are prime targets as well due to their
lack of political power. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the past two decades have
witnessed increasing fees levied on low-level infractions that are more likely to
be committed by the poor.130 Many of these infractions are unavoidable for those
lacking stable housing, such as sleeping or eating in public.131 Such targeting
supports the existence of revenue-seeking behavior by criminal justice agencies.
Of course, there are limitations to a revenue-seeking agency model. For one,
nonpecuniary motivations, such as altruism or public-oriented goals, may drive
many government agents.132 It is also possible that individual agents receive no
direct benefit from increasing agency revenue. Even so, where agency budgets
depend partly on fee revenue, agency employees will likely be—indeed, have
been133—directed to protect and pursue such revenue. In the aggregate, even
minor incentives to pursue increased fee revenue can result in steadily increasing
fee burdens for individual defendants and across targeted populations.

126. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 55.
127. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 7, at 1382–85 (arguing that the criminal justice over-punishes in part because
government actors generate revenue by capitalizing on criminal justice for their own ends); Logan & Wright,
supra note 98, at 1187–88 (explaining how Oklahoma legislators increased the length of deferred prosecution
supervision in response to budget shortfalls).
128. See infra Part III.A–B.
129. Pay-As-You-Go
Government:
It’ll
Cost
You,
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
27,
2015),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/08/27/itll-cost-you.
130. DOLAN & CARR, supra note 88, at 5, 10–11; NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT’L
COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMES NOT HANDCUFFS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES
(2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/crimreport_2009.pdf (finding that laws
criminalizing poverty and homelessness have increased since 2006).
131. See DOLAN & CARR, supra note 88, at 5.
132. See Blais & Dion, supra note 122, at 656 (summarizing critiques of Niskanen’s model).
133. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 55, at 10–15; CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 125, at 7–
9.
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B. USERS’ RESPONSE TO FEES
Criminal justice fees apply to behavior that is unlikely to change in response
to fee levels. Although a criminal defendant can avoid fees by avoiding criminal
behavior, they are unlikely to do so specifically in response to fee levels. This
disconnect between fees and behavior occurs for various reasons including
psychological factors that undermine fees’ deterrent effect, the marginal nature
of fee burdens in relation to other punishment, and the opacity of fees ex-ante.
The lack of demand responsiveness means that user demand will have little
effect on fees, and that fees will have little effect on user demand. That is, there
is no downward-sloping demand curve to exert some meaningful limit on fees,
as envisioned in the market model.
As an initial matter, it is not clear to what extent sanctions deter criminal
behavior generally. Some argue that criminals are inherently antisocial or
otherwise defective, such that their behavior will not change no matter the
punishment.134 This belief suggests that criminals will ignore fees, as well as
fines and other punishment, when deciding how to behave. However, even those
who believe in deterrence may doubt a straightforward cost-benefit accounting
by those who commit crimes.135 For example, Cesare Beccaria, the progenitor
of deterrence theory, argued in the eighteenth century that peoples’ natural
optimism will cause them to discount uncertain punishment.136 That is, it is the
certainty of punishment, rather than its severity, that prevents crime.137 Thus,
criminals are unlikely to pay much attention to fees when deciding how to
behave, both because they may not get caught, and because, if they are caught,
the amount of fees is uncertain. Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the
134. E.g., Jackson Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 332, 333–
34 (1964) (arguing that only the unsocialized will commit crimes, and that punishment is unlikely to deter such
individuals); James B. Appel & Neil J. Peterson, What’s Wrong with Punishment?, 56 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 450, 453 (1965) (concluding that punishment is ineffective deterrence); Raymond Paternoster,
How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 774 (2010)
(describing scholarship rejecting deterrence theory).
135. Gary S. Becker first applied modern economic analysis to criminal deterrence. See Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176 (1968) (explaining that his model
“assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using
his time and other resources at other activities”); see also Michael Edmund O’Neill, Irrationality and the
Criminal Sanction, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 139, 155 (2004) (explaining that, under standard deterrence theory,
“the rational calculus of the pain of legal punishment offsets the motivation for the crime (presumed to be roughly
constant across offenders but not across offenses), thereby deterring criminal activity”). O’Neill himself rejects
such reasoning, arguing that criminals behave irrationally in part due to various “cognitive defects and
neurological malfunctioning.” Id. at 177; id. at 168–77 (exploring various neurological and cognitive conditions
that may be correlated with violent and antisocial behavior).
136. BONESANA DI BECCARIA, supra note 47, at 94 (“The certainty of a small punishment will make a
stronger impression, than the fear of one more severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping; for it is the nature
of mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest inevitable evil, whilst hope, the best gift of Heaven,
hath the power of dispelling the apprehension of a greater; especially if supported by examples of impunity,
which weakness or avarice too frequently afford.”).
137. Id.; see also Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 215
(2013) (reviewing experimental and quasi-experimental studies on deterrence theory, concluding, among other
things, “that certainty of apprehension is a more effective deterrent than the severity of the ensuing legal
consequences”).
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deterrent effect of criminal justice fees is extremely scarce, leaving this
discussion speculative.138
Perhaps fees have a marginal effect on criminal decision-making, such that
an actor on the margin may take them into consideration.139 He may not know
the total fee burden, but perhaps simply knowing that he will face some fees is
enough to keep him on the straight and narrow. Although such reasoning makes
good sense, several things likely hamper fees’ marginal deterrent effect. For one,
punitive costs are already quite high,140 such that additional fees will likely have
limited behavioral influence. To the extent that criminal defendants compare
benefits and costs, they likely do so in the aggregate, cumulating the total cost
of fines and restitution, and perhaps even incarceration, monitoring, social
sanctioning, and so forth. An additional several hundred or thousand dollars in
fees may not bear heavily on such a decision, deleterious effects
notwithstanding. And, because fee levels do not correlate with the severity of
the offense, a straightforward accounting is difficult.141 Moreover, because fee
debts are often actually paid by users’ family members, rather than defendants
directly, their dampening effect on criminal activity is even less likely.142
Additionally, fee levels are difficult to predict ex ante. Because judges and
others decide the total fee burden after an individual is already locked into the
system, the user does not have pricing information to inform her decision before
committing the offense. The ultimate fee burden depends on many different
factors, including the specific charge, the defendant’s race and gender, and even
the political and demographic makeup of the charging jurisdiction.143 The total
fee burden is not imposed until conviction, sentencing, or even later.144 Being
unable to predict the fee beforehand makes it difficult for a criminal defendant

138. E.g., Wheeler et al., supra note 17, at 73 (not directly measuring fees’ effect, but finding no evidence
that supervision fees deterred bad behavior). Evidence on the deterrent effect of fines, or lack thereof, is also
relatively scarce, although it does exist. See, e.g., Don Weatherburn & Steve Moffatt, The Specific Deterrent
Effect of Higher Fines on Drink-Driving Offenders, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 789, 790 (2011) (commenting on
the scarcity of evidence regarding the deterrent effect of fines); Id. at 798 (finding no significant effect of fines
on recommitting a drunk-driving offense).
139. This is likely particularly true for financial crimes, where bad actors are more likely to do some version
of cost-benefit analysis. Ruback, supra note 11, at 1816.
140. Punitive costs might include fines and restitution, but also nonfiscal costs such as incarceration and
social sanctioning. For a holistic consideration of the economic harms of criminal punishment, including
financial obligations as well as limited employment opportunities and reduced earnings of those convicted of
crimes, see Harris et al., supra note 48; HARRY J. HOLZER, STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, URB. INST.,
EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS FACING EX -OFFENDERS 10–11 (2003), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/59416/410855-Employment-Barriers-Facing-Ex-Offenders.PDF (citing survey data showing that
most employers are unwilling to hire ex-offenders).
141. Lesser offenses often carry higher fee burdens. See Harris et al., supra note 48, at 253–54. Because
fees can move in the opposite direction from other forms of punishment, the two may effectively offset each
other. Although, such calculus is only relevant to those comparing the possible consequences of different crimes,
as opposed to those deciding whether or not to commit a specific crime.
142. See EISEN, supra note 68, at 4–5.
143. See Harris et al., supra note 48, at 253–54 (examining determinants of criminal fines and fees).
144. BANNON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
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to take such costs into consideration.145 Additionally, while defendants may
have some choice over certain aspects of the adjudicatory process—for example,
whether to plead guilty or go to trial—all choices may carry significant fees
beyond their control.146 For example, programs offered as alternatives to trial,
such as pre-trial diversionary programs, may accrue significant fees for
monitoring services.147
The upshot of these various psychological and structural factors is that
demand for criminal justice services is largely nonresponsive to fee levels. That
is, criminal justice services do not face a traditional downward-sloping demand
curve. If user demand is nonresponsive to price increases, it means both that user
demand will have no effect on fees, and that fees will have no effect on user
demand. The result is that there is no market structure to provide fee-setting
principles subject to reasonable limits.
Externality Pricing. Of course, even in a market environment, we should
not expect law enforcement agencies to reduce fee levels in response to criminal
behavior, because doing so would encourage crime. Instead, the more apposite
pricing model here is that of negative externalities. An externality model
suggests that law enforcement agencies should set fees to include social costs,
to force users to internalize the cost of their bad behavior.148 In a market-like
environment with downward sloping demand, such a pricing scheme may work.
The criminal justice context, however, is not a true market where price and
consumption interact, for all the reasons explained above. Instead, because users
are unlikely to respond to fees, externality pricing will be ineffective.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the inefficacy of externality pricing may also
erode meaningful limits on criminal fee levels. An extreme counterfactual
example demonstrates why. Imagine a law enforcement agency that seeks to
deter bad behavior via fees through externality pricing. This hypothetical agency
can measure the social costs of crime with extreme accuracy. Additionally,
assume that criminals in this hypothetical town are hyper-rational actors who
compare the personal costs and benefits of their crimes and will forego the crime

145. Note that the same reasoning likely does not apply to businesses that face regulatory fees that seek to
account for negative externalities of bad business behavior. Imagine, for example, a “clean-up” fee imposed on
a company that dumps toxic waste. Like criminal justice fees, such a fee is mandatory for those subject to the
regulation and also determined after the levied act. However, unlike individual criminal defendants, businesses
are likely savvy enough to understand how such fees are set, and thus better able to consider such costs before
undertaking a sanctioned activity. Further, if such fees are prohibitively high, they may prevent market entry
entirely, reducing the quantity of services consumed in the long run. Such a concern might drive agencies to
keep fees within reasonable bounds. Lastly, businesses have the political power to lobby for reduced regulation,
exerting nonmarket downward pressure on such fees.
146. See Logan & Wright, supra note 98, at 1187–88 (describing the various fees that accrue to trial
alternatives).
147. See id.
148. See supra notes 113–117 and accompanying text.
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where costs exceed benefits.149 Knowing this, the agency sets fees to include the
total marginal cost of each specific criminal act, including social cost.150
Crime levels would fall in response to these fees, as criminals weigh the
costs and benefits of their crimes and find a negative result. The only crimes that
would occur now are those in which the benefit to the criminal exceeds the total
social cost. (Perhaps certain drug crimes fit into this category.) The law
enforcement agency would not increase fees above this level, as doing so would
cause a net loss of wellbeing to society. Further, at a certain point the law
enforcement agency would begin to lose revenue by raising fees too much, due
to the reduced demand for criminal justice services. Thus, even if fees are set to
reduce negative externalities, downward-sloping demand still imposes some
meaningful limit on fee levels.
In the nonmarket environment of the actual criminal justice system, this
reasoning does not hold. Agencies may as well inflate fees high above actual
social cost, since doing so will have no negative effect on wellbeing or
revenue—partly because demand is nonresponsive and partly because agencies
can control service consumption as described above.151 Moreover, and as
discussed below, the concept of social cost is sufficiently expansive as to impose
little meaningful restraint on fee levels.152 Thus, in the context of nonmarket
criminal justice fees, externality pricing fails to provide an effective limiting
principle.
Together, these two features—agency power and users’ failures to respond
to fee levels—describe a nonmarket environment quite distinct from that
envisioned by public finance models. These nonmarket fees are subject to no
meaningful restraint, facing little downward limit and only upward pressure on
fee levels. The lack of restraint has several negative consequences, described
below. First, however, the next Subpart explains why existing legal guardrails
do little to rein in unbounded criminal justice fees.
C. INEFFECTIVE JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
Criminal justice fees are also protected from effective legal attack in many
states. Rather than limiting fees to actual expenditures, a fee’s propriety in many
states is based largely on whether the charged amount bears a superficial
relationship to the criminal justice system broadly.153 Although a fee must be
149. Such an assumption of rationality underlies economic models of criminal behavior. See Becker, supra
note 135, at 176; O’Neill, supra note 135, at 155 (describing such reasoning).
150. This theoretical example is unrealistic, among other reasons, because social cost is difficult, even
impossible, to define and measure.
151. See supra Part II.A.
152. For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 164–166.
153. See, e.g., Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 518–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (upholding a DNA record
fee, part of which supported the state highway fund, despite no direct connection to the costs associated with the
defendant’s case); Machado v. State, No. 02-15-00365-CR, 2016 WL 3962731, at *4 (Tex. App. July 21, 2016)
(upholding Peraza v. State, which the court described as “reject[ing] the ‘necessary or incidental’ standard as
governing the constitutionality of court costs”); State v. Young, 238 So. 2d 589, 589 (Fla. 1970) (upholding a
state statute permitting a $1 fee deposited into state general revenue funds, imposed on those convicted of
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“reasonable,”154 various line-drawing problems render amorphous a
reasonableness inquiry with regard to fee levels. Perhaps most important, the
amount of services imposed on an individual payor goes unquestioned, leaving
agencies free to increase fee revenue by increasing the amount of services
provided to criminal defendants. The result is that fee levels can increase
indefinitely, with judicial doctrine imposing only limited restraint.
Even in its strongest form, the judicial doctrine governing user fee
requirements typically fails to interrogate the propriety or level of the services
that agencies provide to payors. In most states, courts traditionally have imposed
three user fee requirements: (1) The payor must directly benefit from the service
being provided or the regulatory program being implemented; (2) the fee must
be related to the cost of the government activity, rather than raising general
revenue funds; and (3) the fee must be voluntary.155 Note that none of the three
prongs would allow a court to invalidate a fee on the grounds that the
government overprovided unnecessary services to inflate fee revenue. Thus,
although courts certainly can, and in some cases do, inquire as to whether the
fee level is commensurate with the services provided, the incentives of the
agency to inflate those services tend to go largely unquestioned.156
Additionally, courts have gradually weakened each prong of the test as they
seek to strike a balance between enforcing fiscal restrictions and enabling local
governments to raise needed revenue.157 The voluntariness requirement has
suffered particular damage. In the mid-1990s, courts in many states began to
hold that voluntariness was no longer a required element of user fees.158 In other

violating state or local laws); State v. Claborn, 870 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that a fee
“reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice system” does not violate the separation of
powers doctrine).
154. See Silva v. City of Attleboro, 908 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Mass. 2009) (“Although a municipality has no
independent power of taxation, it may assess, levy, and collect fees when the Legislature has authorized it to do
so, provided that those fees are reasonable and proportional.”); State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 741–42 (Haw.
1999) (declining to require that user fees be voluntary, instead requiring that they be “reasonably proportionate
to the benefit received”); Rizzo v. City of Philadelphia, 668 A.2d 236, 238 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (finding that
fees charged for emergency medical services “are proper if they are reasonably proportional to the costs of the
regulation or the services performed”).
155. See, e.g., Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984).
156. Courts have, however, considered incentives faced by criminal courts and public defenders to seek
criminal convictions in order to increase fee revenue, to the detriment of due process rights. See, e.g., Bice v.
La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 714–15 (5th Cir. 2012) (considering whether fees paid upon conviction to
plaintiff’s criminal attorney created a disincentive for attorneys to pursue the client’s exoneration); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding that subjecting a defendant to a trial before a local judge and village
mayor, with a “direct … pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant” violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Ward v. City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972) (holding the same); Dugan
v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 65 (1928) (holding that due process rights were not violated when a mayor with a fixed
salary and limited executive authority acted as a judge).
157. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 396 (“[B]y categorizing charges that bear increasing similarity to taxes as
fees or other non-tax charges, courts provide a convenient way for local governments to raise general revenues
without having to worry about anti-tax strictures.”).
158. Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 741–42 (summarizing the declining reliance on voluntariness in determining the
validity of fees); Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 310–11, 311 n.8 (Colo. 1989) (declining to “engraft
a ‘voluntariness’ factor onto the tax-fee distinction” in resolving the case).
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states, courts simply prioritize other factors or fail to consider voluntariness
directly when assessing the validity of fees.159 Only thirteen states continue to
uphold voluntariness as a central factor in adjudicating user fee litigation.160 The
abandonment of the voluntariness requirement is notable because the lack of
user agency has contributed to criminal justice fees’ nonmarket nature.
Importantly, although there is diversity among states in this regard, courts
often hold that the relationship between the fee and the cost to provide the
service need not be mathematically accurate or closely monitored.161 A
“reasonable” link between the fee and the general service will suffice.162 In a
criminal context, courts have held that charges levied against criminal
defendants need only be “reasonably related to the costs of administering the
criminal justice system,” rather than the specific cost of administering the court
case.163 The problem then lies in determining what is reasonable.164 A brief
159. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, ten years after holding otherwise in a widely cited opinion,
Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984), stated that “the element of choice is not
a compelling consideration which can be used to invalidate an otherwise legitimate charge.” Nuclear Metals,
Inc. v. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Bd., 656 N.E.2d 563, 570 (1995) (upholding as valid a mandatory
fee levied against a producer of radioactive waste); see also HENCHMAN, supra note 38, at 12–13; Medeiros,
973 P.2d at 741–42.
160. HENCHMAN, supra note 38, at 12–13, tbl.3; see, e.g., Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 270
(Mich. 1998) (holding voluntariness to be an important factor in determining the validity of a city’s storm water
service charge). In states where voluntariness remains a relevant criterion, the boundaries of voluntariness are
often stretched to accommodate novel categories of user fees. See Reynolds, supra note 21, at 412 (arguing that
courts stretch the definition of voluntary by concluding that the charge is voluntary because the payor can cease
engaging in the levied activity, stating that “[b]y that reasoning, many taxes are likewise voluntary—to avoid
income taxes, a taxpayer need only stop earning income”) (citing Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Cnty. of Kern, 23
Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1993)). In addition to criminal court fees, other fees cover police and fire
protection and mandatory recycling and garbage collection. Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 947 N.E.2d 9,
22–23 (Mass. 2011) (holding that a $110 fee for DNA collection, payable by all individuals convicted of a crime
that was punishable by imprisonment, was a valid regulatory fee); City of Clarksburg v. Grandeotto, Inc., 513
S.E.2d 177, 182 (W. Va. 1998); Hochstedler v. St. Joseph Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910, 916
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Rogers v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 749 So. 2d 966, 969 (Miss. 1999)
(upholding a mandatory garbage collection fee assessed against payors who did not use the service). But see
Dawson v. Sec’y of State, 739 N.W.2d 339, 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (holding a “driver responsibility fee”
invalid in part because it was “automatic upon the conviction of relevant offenses” and therefore not voluntary).
161. See, e.g., Kent Cnty. Water Auth. v. State Dep’t of Health, 723 A.2d 1132, 1136 (R.I. 1999) (upholding
a fee despite the fact that it did not exactly match costs and a portion of fee revenue was deposited into general
funds); see also Mountain View Ltd. P’ship v. City of Clifton Forge, 504 S.E.2d 371, 376 (Va. 1998) (deferring
to the city’s fee calculation methodology and requiring only that there be a “reasonable correlation” between a
cost and benefit; holding a fee to be valid despite the existence of a surplus).
162. Mountain View Ltd. P’ship, 504 S.E.2d at 376.
163. State v. Claborn, 870 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); see also Broyles v. State, 688 S.W.2d
290, 291–93 (Ark. 1985) (holding a $250 fee levied against a DUI defendant was constitutional, despite being
allocated to general programs addressing drunk driving and alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation); Peraza v.
State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 518–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (holding constitutional a “DNA record fee” imposed on
a criminal court defendant, a portion of which went to a criminal justice planning account, and a portion to the
state highway fund). But see Safety Net for Abused Persons v. Segura, 692 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (La. 1997) (holding
unconstitutional a fee imposed on all convicted criminal defendants that funded domestic violence education
and counseling).
164. For example, courts must decide whether to include capital expenditures, and to what extent. Darien
Shanske, Interpreting State Fiscal Constitutions: A Modest Proposal, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1331, 1340 (2017)
(terming this a problem of “allocating capital costs”).
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consideration of this problem evinces its intractable nature. For example, should
court fees include past or future expenses, such as the cost of constructing or
updating the courthouse building?165
Where a fee might include negative externalities, a court must also assess
what constitutes reasonable social cost. Doing so is exceedingly complex,
perhaps even impossible. Should such fees encompass harm to friends and
family only? Immediate neighbors? Anyone who could potentially have been
harmed? The circle of potential harm is seemingly endless. Thus, with
reasonable linkage as the only true constraint, judicial doctrine provides little
meaningful limit on the fees described above.166
In many states, revenue recovery is now the sole criterion by which user
fees are judged. That is, agencies cannot levy criminal justice fees to raise
general revenue or revenue for services fully outside of the criminal justice
system.167 Of course, defining the boundaries of the funded system raises all the
line-drawing issues just enumerated—does the criminal justice system include
counseling services for victims? Or educational programs?168 What about
highways on which police officers drive?169 The practical effect of these judicial
rules is merely to prevent agencies from transferring fee revenue to general
coffers. Because money is fungible, agencies can use fees to increase budgets
by offsetting what would otherwise be paid by tax revenue. Further, it is worth
reiterating that establishing a reasonable link does little to prevent agencies from
providing unwanted or inflated services to payors.
This brief summary has outlined a general trend among state courts toward
lax enforcement of user fee doctrine. One upshot of this review is that litigating
fees’ validity will be challenging. However, the necessary brevity of this Subpart
minimizes the diverse approaches to fee doctrine throughout the country. Courts
in some states, such as Michigan, continue to strictly enforce user fee
requirements, including voluntariness.170 In such places, litigating user fees as
invalid charges may offer one route to rein in their growth. Although developing

165. The Supreme Court of Florida has answered this question in the affirmative. See State v. Young, 238
So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. 1970) (“[Criminal defendants] should be made to share in the improvement of the agencies
that society has had to employ in defense against the very acts for which he has been convicted.”).
166. Reitz, supra note 11, at 1762 (“There are reports of agencies collecting fees in excess of their actual
expenditures on particular offenders—and protections against such practices are virtually nonexistent.”).
167. See State v. Lanclos, 980 So. 2d 643, 654 (La. 2008) (holding that criminal court fees levied to fund
the Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission were “too far attenuated from the ‘administration of justice,’
to be considered a legitimate court cost”); Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (holding
that a criminal court fee paid to the Health and Human Services Commission failed to serve a valid criminal
justice purpose); HENCHMAN, supra note 38, at 5–6.
168. Broyles, 688 S.W.2d at 291, 293 (upholding a fee that funded drunk driving and alcohol and drug abuse
rehabilitation).
169. Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 518–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (upholding a fee paid to the state
highway fund).
170. See, e.g., Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 272–73 (Mich. 1998) (striking down a local
stormwater remediation fee under strict interpretation of the judicial fee doctrine). See infra notes 259–265 and
accompanying text for further analysis of the enforcement of fee doctrine in the context of criminal justice fees
in Michigan.
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such a litigation strategy is not this Article’s primary goal, the question is briefly
introduced below.171

III. HARMS OF NONMARKET FEES
A. FEE-CHASING BEHAVIOR
Unbounded criminal justice fees create incentives for agencies to
overprovide fee-funded services.172 In the context of the criminal justice system,
overprovision means over-policing, over-incarceration, lengthened probation
monitoring, and so forth. Given scarce resources, overprovision of one
government service also means under-provision of other desirable government
services—that is, less attention devoted to important, but nonremunerative,
public safety needs.173 Thus, these nonmarket fees obviate the allocative
efficiency improvement that user fees are intended to provide.174 Public
wellbeing suffers as a result.
As explained above,175 criminal justice agencies should respond to fee
incentives and monopoly power by seeking increased fee revenue from criminal
defendants. These incentives operate separately from public-safety needs.
Government may pursue fee revenue by increasing the fee level or by increasing
provision of fee-funded services. There is evidence of agencies pursuing both
activities.176 For example, legislators in Oklahoma responded to prosecutor
office budget shortfalls by increasing the monthly fee level as well as the
mandatory length of deferred prosecution supervision.177 In Ferguson, Missouri,
police supervisors instructed officers to pursue fee-generating ticketing and
citations to generate revenue for the department, regardless of public safety
needs.178 Researchers in Massachusetts have found evidence that police in
municipalities that rely on nontax revenue are more likely to issue fee-funded

171. See infra Part IV.B.2.
172. Niskanen made a similar argument in 1968, positing that government bureaucrats subject to budget
appropriations operate to maximize their budgets, resulting in overproduction. Niskanen, supra note 122, at 296,
303 (concluding that the government would overprovide public services). Although the agency in his model
does not rely on fee revenue, id. at 294, the same result should hold for an agency that collects fee revenue, as
collecting greater fee revenue would increase the agency budget just as an increased budget appropriation would.
173. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 6, at 31 (arguing that requiring probation officers to collect
probation fees diverts them from other important duties; describing that Louisiana eliminated such fees due to
these concerns).
174. Duff, supra note 14, at 398–99; see supra Part I.C.
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 7, at 1385 (arguing that the criminal justice overpunishes in part because
government actors generate revenue by capitalizing on criminal justice for their own ends); Logan & Wright,
supra note 98, at 1188 & n.83 (explaining how Oklahoma legislators increased the length of deferred prosecution
supervision in response to budget shortfalls).
177. Logan & Wright, supra note 98, at 1188 & n.83.
178. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUST., supra note 55, at 9–15 (“City and police leadership pressure officers to write
citations, independent of any public safety need, and rely on citation productivity to fund the City budget.”); see
also id. at 14 (describing the process of setting revenue targets for municipal courts).
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traffic citations.179 It is also common practice for probation agencies to continue
criminal monitoring of parolees purely to collect unpaid fee revenue—thereby
increasing the monitoring fees owed.180
This evidence suggests that public officials have responded rationally to the
incentives presented to them. They have the power to increase fee revenue, and
they have done so. Importantly, they have responded to these revenue incentives,
at least in part, independent of public safety needs. This suggests likely
overallocation of resources to fee-funded criminal justice services, which may
contravene public wellbeing.
Given scarce resources, we should also expect agencies to underprovide
non-fee-funded services, and indeed do find some evidence of this. For example,
researchers have found that police departments that are more reliant on fee
revenue solve violent crimes at a significantly lower rate.181 The U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights raised such a concern in their report on criminal
justice fines and fees, arguing that overreliance on court fees “conflict[s] with
judicial independence, and divert[s] attention from courts’ essential
functions.”182 Where the overlooked activities are welfare enhancing, public
wellbeing will be harmed.
B. EXPLOITATION OF THE POLITICALLY POWERLESS
A lack of meaningful fee restraints coupled with agency revenue incentives
may lead to exploitation of the powerless. By targeting politically powerless
groups, criminal justice agencies reduce the risk of political reprisal. As a result
of such exploitation, low-income households, people of color, and other
marginalized populations bear the brunt of funding public services from which
everyone benefits.
Evidence of exploitation and disparate impact in the criminal justice system
is abundant.183 People of color are more likely to be incarcerated than white
people,184 which means that a disproportionate share of prison budgets is likely
funded by communities of color—including not just incarcerated individuals but
their families as well. A significant body of research also finds that police
officers are more likely to pull over and issue traffic citations to people of
color.185 Researchers in Las Vegas, Nevada, found that nearly two-thirds of
179. E.g., Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines
Traffic Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 526 (2009) (finding that traffic fines are correlated with a greater
budget need for nontax revenue, and that nonresidents are more likely to receive fines).
180. Reitz, supra note 11, at 1762.
181. Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances, & Hye Young You, Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement,
and the Quality of Government Service, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 5, 8 (2020).
182. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 56, at 2.
183. As just one example, see id. at 34–35.
184. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited
Feb. 4, 2021).
185. E.g., E. BAY CMTY. L. CTR., STOPPED, FINED, AND ARRESTED: RACIAL BIAS IN POLICING AND TRAFFIC
COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 5 (2016), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_
BOTRCA.pdf (citing statistics showing that Black and Latinx drivers are pulled over at rates highly
disproportionate to their share in the population); Findings, STANFORD OPEN POLICING PROJECT,
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traffic citations in 2015 came from residents of the seven poorest zip codes,
which were predominantly populated by African-American and Latinx
residents.186 Other research finds that police officers are more likely to issue
tickets to out-of-town drivers, who, although perhaps not marginalized, also lack
political power.187
The criminalization of poverty plays an important role here as well.
According to several accounts, the mid-2000s witnessed an increase in fines and
fees levied on low-level infractions that are more likely to be committed by the
poor.188 Not only do the poor lack political power, but such targeting heightens
the regressive effect of fee-funding. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has
noted such exploitation, stating in its report on criminal fines and fees:
The best available data reflects [sic] that municipal fee targeting tends to
aggregate in communities of color and, to a lesser degree, in low-income
communities. Targeting means these municipalities exploit their poorest
citizens by, among other means, using law enforcement as ticketing and
collections agencies to increase municipal revenues as distinct from focusing
on public safety and civil compliance.189

Criminal justice agencies lessen the likelihood of political reprisal by
targeting politically powerless and unpopular groups.190 Criminal defendants (as
well as nonresidents) are especially appealing targets because they often lack the
right to vote.191 As of 2016, over half of U.S. states circumscribed the voting
rights of those who owe criminal justice debt, which includes fees.192 Thus, those
most exploited by criminal debt have little power to fight back against
unbounded fees. Moreover, residents and policymakers may feel that these
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (finding that when pulled over for
speeding, Black drivers are 20% more likely to get a ticket—rather than a warning—than white drivers, and
Hispanic drivers are 30% more likely to be ticketed than white drivers); Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan
Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty,
Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across
the United States, STAN. COMPUTATIONAL POL’Y LAB, Mar. 13, 2019, at 1, 5, http://web.stanford.edu/~csimoiu/
doc/traffic-stops.pdf#:~:text=A%20largescale%20analysis%20of%20racial%20disparities%20in%20police,
Computational%20Policy%20Lab%20March%2013%2C%202019%20EXECUTIVE%20SUMMARY
(finding that Black and Hispanic drivers were searched during 3.8% and 3.6% of stops, respectively, compared
to 1.6% for stopped white drivers).
186. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 56, at 30; James DeHaven, Las Vegas’ Low-Income Areas Hit
Harder by Parking Tickets, Analysis Shows, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 17, 2015, 4:50 PM),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/las-vegas-low-income-areas-hit-harder-by-parkingtickets-analysis-shows/.
187. See Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 179, at 516–17.
188. DOLAN & CARR, supra note 88, at 5; NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 130,
at 10–11 (finding that laws criminalizing poverty and homelessness have increased since 2006).
189. U.S. COMM. ON C.R., supra note 56, at 72.
190. Pay-As-You-Go Government, supra note 129.
191. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 49.
192. See id. Florida state legislators added a voting restriction on criminal justice debtors in 2019. See
Patricia Mazzei, Florida Limits Ex-Felon Voting, Prompting a Lawsuit and Cries of ‘Poll Tax’, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/florida-felons-voting-rights.html. The Eleventh
Circuit upheld the restriction in September 2020, finding that it did not violate voting rights provided in the U.S.
Constitution. Jones v. Governor of Florida, 975 F.3d 1016, 1025 (11th Cir. 2020).
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groups ought to bear a higher cost for using public services.193 Such a sentiment
further reduces the likelihood that policymakers will step in to protect targeted
groups from exploitation.
A person’s political power and popularity (or lack thereof) should not
determine her cost of government. Charging powerless groups with higher fee
burdens may be convenient, but it is unprincipled and fundamentally at odds
with fair public administration.
C. HUMAN COST
Because fees can balloon essentially unhindered, resulting fee amounts bear
no relationship to an individual’s ability to pay. While all fees are structurally
separate from ability to pay, a user’s ability to forego the service imposes some
personal limit.194 Not so for criminal fees. Further, courts impose such fees on
individuals as individuals—that is, not on their properties or businesses. This
means that individuals have no last resort option to escape the fees, such as
borrowing against or selling property or closing a business. And, because these
fees are imposed during the criminal process, they are often not dischargeable
in bankruptcy.195 For all these reasons, criminal justice fees inflict significant
human cost.
After including interest and other collection charges,196 these fee burdens
can become an insurmountable financial hurdle for individuals already facing
the significant challenge of finding employment with a criminal record.197
Thousands of dollars in debt translates into severe hardship for payors. Many
fee debtors face wage garnishment, bank account levies, and property liens.198
Further, because these fees take so long to pay, individuals continue to show
pending criminal cases on their record, which can make securing work yet more
difficult.199
The human toll is substantial. For many, fees lead to years of debt and
continued monitoring by the criminal justice system.200 This never-ending
government oversight causes frustration and erodes trust in the criminal justice

193. See Willon, supra note 16 (describing a Riverside County jail fee and quoting a county official who
remarked that those who “do the crime, . . . [will also] pay the dime”).
194. It is worth questioning whether such ability exists for necessary utilities, like heat in freezing
temperatures.
195. See In re Sanders, 589 B.R. 874, 881 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2018).
196. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 28–41 tbl.2.4 (discussing various collection fees by state, including interest
and payment plan fees); id. at 52–55 (describing individuals’ experiences with criminal justice debt, which only
rose due to interest, despite debtors making regular payments).
197. FIN. JUST. PROJECT, supra note 67, at 2 (noting that most formerly incarcerated individuals in their
survey were unemployed, and that those who were employed earned on average $2,500 per year).
198. Id. at 6.
199. Id. at 10.
200. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 56–57 (explaining that those with lower income make smaller monthly
payments, resulting in larger total debt burdens over time due to high interest rates); DILLER, supra note 96, at
10–13 (describing how Florida’s criminal justice debt hinders reentry by straining debtors’ ability to pay for
basic needs).

550

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:517

system, as payors feel exploited.201 Some are forced into untenable living
situations, such as relying on estranged partners.202 Government debt also makes
securing credit difficult or impossible, preventing some from buying vehicles or
homes, and otherwise constraining their independence and stability.203 Debt can
also strain relationships, for example, by preventing people from marrying.204
As these hardships compound, debtors often face deep and prolonged despair.205
This human cost extends to defendants’ families as well. Survey research
conducted by the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights found that nonincarcerated family members were primarily responsible for paying criminal
justice debt, including court and prison fees, for nearly two-thirds of respondent
households.206 Thirty-eight percent of paying families reported that court fines
and fees were the most difficult costs to repay, second only to attorney’s fees.207
The report also noted that such costs are disproportionately borne by women,
often mothers and even grandmothers of defendants.208
While a lack of restraint need not cause exorbitant fees, when coupled with
revenue incentives on the part of the collecting agency, such a result is likely.
Unsurprisingly, excessive fees have been the actual result in the criminal justice
system, resulting in significant human cost.
D. A RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL PROTECTION
Some may be unbothered by the ballooning size and scope of criminal
justice fees. Perhaps, they might argue, these fees accurately reflect the cost to
government.209 Perhaps criminal defendants should rightly bear this cost.210 Or
201. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 59.
202. Id. at 63 (describing a debtor forced to live with her ex-husband, which she described as
“uncomfortable”).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 64 (describing a couple who decided not to get married out of fear of the ramifications of one
person’s legal debt).
205. Id. at 70.
206. SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA WALTERS & AZADEH ZOHRABI, ELLA BAKER
CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 13 (2015),
http://whopaysreport.org/who-pays-full-report/ (finding that “63% of respondents reported that family members
were primarily responsible for covering conviction-related costs,” including court fines and fees and
incarceration fees, as well attorney’s fees, commissary costs, bail, and other related charges).
207. Id. at 14.
208. Id.
209. Although, as explained above, determining the actual cost of government services is difficult, and in
some cases impossible. See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text. Truly, the boundary of includible costs
is endless, especially if social costs are considered. See Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d
1350, 1354 (Cal. 1997) (allowing consideration of social harms in setting regulatory fees). The social cost of
criminal behavior could arguably include indeterminable items such as emotional trauma, increased future police
costs, and so forth. Thus, the potential inclusion of social costs renders such an inquiry pointless. This reasoning
may suggest that fees are not appropriate in such circumstances, and even that fines may be the more appropriate
absorber of social cost.
210. Supporters of such fees might argue that this distribution of costs is appropriate because these payors
make disproportionate use of the service being funded. Similar arguments have been made in the context of other
fees, such as fire response fees. See, e.g., Kevin Schwaller, City of Peoria Looking to Add Fees for Fire
Department
Responses,
CENT.
ILL.
PROUD
(Feb.
7,
2019,
10:13
PM),
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perhaps these fees encompass negative externalities, deter bad behavior, or
punish the guilty.211
Even if true, none of these rationales obviates the government’s
responsibility to ensure a principled limit on fees imposed on system users.212 In
other words, the lack of a principled limit on government exactions is per se
harmful. While the other three harms described in this Part are consequential,
this harm is based in payors’ inherent rights. Specifically, payors deserve
meaningful political and procedural protections against potentially exploitative
government exactions.213
Political philosophy frameworks tend to agree that coercive government
exactions must be subject to some restraint, whether by individual or aggregate
consent, or via substantive limits such as fairness principles.214 Without
restriction, for instance, government exactions risk becoming unauthorized
takings.215 Taxes escape such a fate, according to some, because they are enacted
by elected representatives and thus benefit from aggregate consent via the
political process.216 At the state and local level, taxes are also often subject to
voter approval, further increasing aggregate consent.217
For fees, because courts and agencies typically decide fee amounts,218 the
aggregate consent conferred via elected officials and public political processes
is severely attenuated. Fees’ legitimacy instead most often arises not from
aggregate consent, but from individual consent. Payors can avoid most user fees
by foregoing the levied good or service. Not so for criminal justice fees. Lacking
both aggregate and individual consent, other substantive restrictions are
necessary to protect payors from exploitation.219 However, as described above,
neither the market, nor the political process, nor, in many states, the judicial
https://www.centralillinoisproud.com/news/local-news/city-of-peoria-looking-to-add-fees-for-fire-departmentresponses/ (explaining that fees are appropriate to fund fire services rather than a property tax increase because
“not all residents call the fire department”).
211. Surely, the desire to punish criminal acts and deter criminal behavior plays a role in the ballooning of
criminal justice fees. However, it neither fully explains nor justifies the size of criminal justice fees, because the
fees bear no relationship to the severity of the offense. In fact, lesser offenses often carry larger fee burdens. See
Harris et al., supra note 48, at 253–54.
212. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
213. Such rights are enshrined, most notably, in Fifth Amendment protections against government takings
without compensation, U.S. CONST. amend. V, as well as Eighth Amendment protections against excessive fines,
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
214. Wolfgang Schön, Taxation and Democracy, 72 TAX L. REV. 235, 244–45 (2019) (labeling these as
consent- versus content-based restrictions).
215. See Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle,
and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 203–06 (2002) (defining a possible boundary between
taxes and takings).
216. M’Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819) (“In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its
constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.”); Schön, supra
note 214, at 238 (noting, but ultimately questioning, the common view that taxation is “legitimized by the
people’s consent” via elected representatives).
217. Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Tax Limits and the Future of Local Democracy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1884, 1920
tbl.1 (2020).
218. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 27.
219. See Schön, supra note 214, at 236, 254.
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process imposes meaningful restraint on criminal justice fees. The lack of
restriction violates payors’ fundamental right to protection from unrestrained
government exactions.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A PUBLIC FINANCE FRAMEWORK
Applying a public finance framework to criminal justice fees is useful for at
least two reasons. First, it allows us not only to recognize a serious structural
flaw in criminal justice fees, but also to identify and distinguish similar fees
imposed in other settings. Criminal justice fees serve as the most extreme
example of nonmarket fees, which fall along a spectrum ranging from benign to
severely problematic, as described below.220
Second, a public finance lens suggests certain judicial and policy reforms
for egregious nonmarket fees. Most importantly, policymakers should seriously
consider whether fee-financing is appropriate where a monopolistic agency
provides a mandatory service to a captive payor. Fees may be patently
inappropriate in such a nonmarket context. However, if policymakers decide
otherwise, nonmarket fees must be subject to meaningful restraint and should
avoid creating perverse incentives for collecting agencies. To that end, the
Article briefly surveys several judicial and statutory reforms that judges and
policymakers should consider, including reinstituting a voluntariness
requirement, limiting fees to actual expenses, prohibiting agencies from keeping
the fee revenue they collect, and placing a per-person cap on total fees.
A. COMPARING NONMARKET FEES
Many user fees operate outside of a market environment, particularly
regulatory or licensing fees.221 For instance, a driver’s license is a basic necessity
in most places in the United States and can only be obtained from the state motor
vehicle agency. Such agencies clearly do not operate in a competitive market.
Yet, driver’s license fees are unlikely to raise the same concerns highlighted
above.
This Subpart breaks down the reasoning in Part II, detailing user fee
characteristics that may erode meaningful constraints. Doing so provides a
framework for evaluating other potentially exploitative nonmarket fees. This
analysis reveals that nonmarket fees fall on a loose continuum, with criminal
justice fees occupying the extreme end.
Monopolistic Agency. A government monopoly is a necessary condition for
unbounded fees, but it is not a sufficient condition on its own. Many government
agencies are monopoly providers of the public goods and services they offer
because they operate without significant competition.222 That fact alone does not
220. Jensen, supra note 25 (describing fees imposed on accident victims).
221. A regulatory fee is based on the government’s police power to regulate a certain activity, often
including licensing or inspection fees. See Duff, supra note 14, at 393 (defining regulatory fees); supra notes
31–37 and accompanying text (describing user fees and regulatory fees).
222. Examples of monopoly-provided public goods include police and military protection, courts, regulatory
licenses, parks, public transportation, and the postal service. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C.
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render their fee-pricing suspect. So long as the government monopolist faces the
limits of consumer demand, it will face some limits on fee pricing.223
Mandatory Services Decided by the Agency. This feature contributes
significantly to criminal fees’ unbounded nature. Where agencies assign
mandatory services to users, consumer demand cannot exert downward pressure
on fee levels.224 The feature encompasses agencies’ power to decide the level of
service consumption, as well as users’ inability to reduce or forego consumption
of the charged service. Importantly, when agencies have the power to determine
service consumption, they face incentives to increase the fee-funded services
provided to users.
Lack of User Choice to Enter the Regulated System. If users cannot avoid
triggering the charged service at the outset, they are at the whim of agencies that
face perverse fiscal incentives to inflate service provision.225 For instance,
criminal behavior is based on complex social and psychological factors226 and is
therefore quite distinct from, say, the decision to purchase real estate that may
be subject to mandatory fees. Even within the criminal justice system, fees differ
with regard to the user’s initial control over triggering fees. For instance, one
surely can choose whether or not to commit premeditated murder. However,
someone who lacks stable housing may have little control over sleeping or eating
on the sidewalk.227
Users’ Lack of Political Power. The powerlessness of targeted payors is an
important feature as well. Agencies may be able to target criminal defendants in
part because criminal defendants lack the political power to effectively challenge
exploitative charges.228 In contrast, where payors represent an important

Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 983,
986 (2013) (describing various government-run or government-sanctioned monopolies, including public
schools); U.S. POSTAL SERV., UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THE POSTAL MONOPOLY: A BRIEF HISTORY 12 (2008),
https://about.usps.com/universal-postal-service/universal-service-and-postal-monopoly-history.pdf
(“The
group of federal laws known collectively as the Private Express Statutes gives the United States Postal Service
a monopoly over the carriage of letter-mail.”).
223. See supra notes 106–112 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 120–128 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 175–180 and accompanying text.
226. For a more detailed discussion of these factors, see supra Part II.B.
227. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
228. Criminal defendants may lack political power for several reasons. First, formerly incarcerated
individuals may be unable to vote in many jurisdictions, directly curtailing an important source of political
power. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 49. Second, they often belong to historically marginalized groups, such as racial
minorities and the poor, that have been targets of political suppression. See supra notes 183–189 and
accompanying text; see also Danyelle Solomon, Connor Maxwell & Abril Castro, Systematic Inequality and
American Democracy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/race/reports/2019/08/07/473003/systematic-inequality-american-democracy/ (explaining how recent
Supreme Court decisions may result in the suppression of voters of color). Lastly, criminal defendants’
unpopularity may reduce the public outcry over their exploitation. See Pay-As-You-Go Government, supra note
129; see also Reynolds, supra note 21, at 390–91 (“[T]he realities of political representation will undoubtedly
provide an incentive for local government to seek a way to impose costs on those who have no voice in its
political process.”).
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political constituency, or where they are able to organize into a cohesive group,
they may have some protections against ballooning fee burdens.229
Other Factors. Other factors are important to identifying and differentiating
harmful from benign nonmarket fees. For example, the involvement of private
companies in levying and collecting fees exacerbates many of the perverse
incentives described herein, in part due to lack of political oversight.230 On the
payor side, private insurance companies may alleviate some of the harms
delineated above by paying individuals’ fee burdens and by acting as a powerful
lobbying group. Additionally, some fee structures reflect users’ ability to pay,
such as those based on property size, which also reduces individual harms.
Together, these characteristics describe a nonmarket user fee continuum.
Fees that exhibit fewer problematic characteristics, or exhibit them more weakly,
will have built-in constraints and thus should not require additional intervention.
Those fees that exhibit a greater number of problematic characteristics, or
exhibit them more strongly, will require additional restraint via courts and
policymakers. Many criminal justice fees occupy the extreme end of the
continuum and therefore require additional constraints. At the other end of the
continuum may lie other nonmarket fees that differ from criminal justice fees in
notable ways, for example, fees attaching to real property or business licensing
fees.
Fees that attach to real property seemingly bear many similarities to
nonmarket criminal justice fees, and thus require special attention.231 For
instance, special assessments fund public capital improvements via mandatory
property assessments.232 The cost of new sidewalks might be funded by a special
assessment levied on all properties abutting them.233 Stormwater remediation
fees work similarly, funding agencies that address stormwater runoff, as required
by the Federal Clean Water Act.234 Localities often base the fees on a property’s
impervious surface area because impervious ground cover increases harmful
229. Cf. Reynolds, supra note 21, at 391 (noting that, compared to politically powerless constituencies,
effective opposition to government charges is more likely to arise from “residents who can use the political
process to voice their displeasure with the actions of their local representatives”). For instance, homeowners are
more active in local politics than renters are, which may protect homeowners from exploitative government
charges. See Andrew Hall & Jesse Yoder, Does Homeownership Influence Political Behavior? Evidence from
Administrative Data (Mar. 26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.andrewbenjaminhall.com/
homeowner.pdf (finding that homeowners are more active in local elections compared to non-homeowners).
230. See generally Highsmith, supra note 76, at 13–21 (detailing the involvement of private companies
throughout the corrections system, and describing common problems such as lack of consumer protections,
kickbacks to corrections agencies, lack of consumer choice, and so forth).
231. See Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 304–05 (Colo. 1989) (allowing a “transportation
maintenance fee” charged to property owners for upkeep of city streets abutting their properties); Dean v. Town
of Addison, 534 S.E.2d 403, 405 (W. Va. 2000) (allowing a “fire service fee” to fund a volunteer fire
department). But see Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 333 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (disallowing a
residential street utility charge as an unconstitutional tax); First Baptist Church of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul,
884 N.W.2d 355, 365 (Minn. 2016) (holding that a city’s right-of-way street maintenance assessment was a tax,
not a fee, and thus was “subject to constitutional restrictions on the taxing power”).
232. BIRD, supra note 12, at 17; Reynolds, supra note 21, at 397–402 (describing special assessments).
233. BIRD, supra note 12, at 17; Reynolds, supra note 21, at 397.
234. Water Quality Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2018).
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stormwater runoff.235 Both special assessments and stormwater fees attach to
real property and are assessed against property owners who have limited control
over the charged amount.236
Special assessments, stormwater fees, and other similar charges operate
outside of a normal market. They are levied by monopolistic agencies that decide
the scope of services and the fee amount. And yet, they are not subject to the
same abuses as criminal justice fees because they differ in several important
ways.
For one, homeowners have a great deal of control over whether or not to
enter the regulated system, since they can choose not to buy property in a locality
that levies stormwater fees or other assessments. Most homebuyers engage in a
lengthy research process prior to purchasing a home, which should include
researching property taxes and additional charges. Those who cannot pay such
fees can forgo the home purchase. Certainly, if fees or assessments are enacted
after purchase, payors’ options are more limited. However, those who truly
cannot afford the additional charge can sell their home.
In terms of fee-setting incentives, agencies may still face incentives to
inflate fee levels because any charge remains attached to the property, meaning
that someone must ultimately pay it. However, unlike criminal defendants,
homeowners have political power. They are stable residents of a district, able to
vote in local elections, and tend to be more active in local politics compared to
renters.237 Local agencies may balk at gouging such fee payors for fear of
political reprisal.
Lastly, fees attaching to real property are less harmful to payors’ lives.
Because the charges depend on property size,238 they roughly account for abilityto-pay. And, where the charges funded capital improvements such as new
sidewalks, benefits should be capitalized into the price of the home, allowing the
homeowner to recover a portion of the cost upon sale. For these various reasons,
fees attached to real property do not raise the same concerns as criminal justice
fees.
Further along the continuum, and closer to criminal justice fees, may fall
accident fees and fire fees.239 Such fees allow police and fire departments to bill
motorists or homeowners for services provided in responding to traffic

235. See Scharff, supra note 113, at 205–09 (describing stormwater remediation fees); Jerry Zhirong Zhao,
Camila Fonseca & Raihana Zeerak, Stormwater Utility Fees and Credits: A Funding Strategy for Sustainability,
11 SUSTAINABILITY, Apr. 1, 2019, at 1, 12–13 (exploring the increased use and benefits of stormwater utility
fees).
236. Property owners have some control over the charged amount in the long-term, as they can resurface
their properties with permeable ground cover or choose to live on smaller parcels.
237. See Hall & Yoder, supra note 229, at 2, 22 (finding that homeowners are more active in local elections
compared to non-homeowners).
238. See Scharff, supra note 113, at 205–09.
239. See TAMI STANTON & JOE T HESING, NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., OMINOUS TREND: GROWTH OF
MUNICIPAL ACCIDENT RESPONSE FEES 1 (2006), https://www.namic.org/pdf/publicpolicy/060413Accident
ResponseFees.pdf; Ina Jaffe, ‘Crash Tax’ More Bust than Boom for Many Cities, NPR (Mar. 8, 2011, 12:01
AM), https://www.npr.org/2011/03/08/134265786/crash-tax-more-bust-than-boom-for-many-cities.
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accidents, structure fires, and other emergencies.240 Although insurance
companies cover the cost in some cases, individuals may be held responsible if
their insurance refuses to pay.241
Like criminal court fees, monopolistic agencies impose public safety fees
on system users who have little or no control over the services consumed.242 The
fire department decides how many trucks and firefighters to send, without input
from the homeowner.243 Further, and unlike fees attaching to property, many
payors have no choice in triggering the onset of services—that is, they do not
choose for their house to catch on fire.244 Of course, some do have control over
their actions. A driver using her cell phone chooses to behave unsafely and thus
could have prevented her use of public services. For this reason, fees attaching
only to at-fault individuals are perhaps less problematic than those applying to
faultless accident victims.
Political power is once again an important factor as well, although it cuts in
different directions. Fire department fees typically apply to homeowners, a
group with some political power, as explained above. Nonresident drivers, on

240. See, e.g., Sarah Netter, Fire Departments Charge for Service, Asking Accident Victims to Pay Up, ABC
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010, 7:34 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/fire-department-bills-basic-services-horrifyresidents-insurance/story?id=9736696; David Lohr, Arizona Firefighters Charge Families Nearly $20,000 After
Home Burns Down, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/08/justin-purcell-fire_n_
4242734.html (Nov. 11, 2013); see also Mariel Garza, Opinion: ‘First Responder Fee’ Is a Backward Response
to Changing Duties of Urban Fire Departments, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 1:03 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-first-reponder-fee-long-beach-0724-story.html.
Some states have outlawed certain accident response fees. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 10-118 (West
2020) (enacted 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16,129 (West 2020) (enacted 2011); ALA. CODE § 32-10-13 (West
2020) (enacted 2010); Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 09-153 (Sept. 8, 2009) (holding that a Tennessee statute banning
accident response service fees did not apply to fire departments); Jensen, supra note 25; Sam Metz, Brown Signs
‘Prosecution Fee’ Bill Sparked by Desert Sun Investigation, DESERT SUN, https://www.desertsun.com/
story/news/politics/2018/09/06/california-bans-cities-charging-residents-prosecution-fees/1208614002/ (Sept.
6, 2018).
241. See Complaint at 3, Moore v. Cost Recovery Corp., 2008 WL 823209 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2008) (No.
508-cv-00007DF) (filing claim against Cost Recovery Corporation for debt collection against plaintiff
personally, after her insurance company failed to pay the fees); see also Jaffe, supra note 239 (reporting that
insurance companies often refuse to pay such fees, and that the cost ultimately devolves to the motorist); LEAGUE
OF MINN. CITIES, FIRE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY ISSUES 21 (2019), https://www.lmc.org/wpcontent/uploads/documents/Fire-Department-Management-and-Liability-Issues.pdf (providing that Minnesota
cities and towns can “use any means available to private parties to collect” unpaid fire service fees).
242. See Netter, supra note 240 (detailing costs involved in a fire fee, which are outside of the payor’s
control); Vicki Gonzalez, Questions Surround Sacramento Fire 911 Response Fee, KCRA,
https://www.kcra.com/article/questions-surround-sacramento-fire-911-response-fee/20724253 (May 16, 2018);
Taken for a Ride? Ambulances Stick Patients with Surprise Bills, NBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017, 7:18 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/taken-ride-ambulances-stick-patients-surprise-bills-n824141
(reporting on “questionable billing practices” by ambulance providers).
243. Netter, supra note 240.
244. In the context of car accidents, occasionally such fees are levied only on nonresident drivers or at-fault
drivers. See INT’L FIRE CHIEFS ASS’N, COST RECOVERY FOR FIRE-BASED E MERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICES 1,
https://www.iafc.org/topics-and-tools/resources/resource/cost-recovery-for-fire-based-emergency-responseservices (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (supporting accident fees imposed on nonresident, at-fault motorists).
However, other fees are levied on residents who were not at fault. See Jensen, supra note 25 (reporting that the
scope of the fees varies by location).
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the other hand, lack any political power, making them a particularly vulnerable
payor group.245
The involvement of insurance companies may also mitigate some concerns
about accident and fire fees. By bearing some of the financial burden, they
reduce the human toll of these fees. Insurance companies also represent powerful
business interests that can lobby against many such charges.246 Thus, fees that
may be covered by insurance are less problematic.
Classifying fees according to these features is extraordinarily complex.
Thousands of local and state government agencies, operating under fifty
different state legal systems, impose countless nonmarket charges on users. This
Article cannot comprehensively categorize all such fees. Rather it seeks to
identify and assess one particularly harmful category—criminal justice fees—
and to flag that similar problems could potentially arise in other areas under
certain circumstances. It also seeks to encourage others to undertake similar fee
analysis using the framework provided herein. By being mindful of agency
incentives and payor power, policymakers and advocates can identify and
prevent other potentially unbounded nonmarket fees before they become
entrenched.
B. REFORMING NONMARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES
Recognizing the nonmarket nature of criminal justice fees suggests certain
reforms. In the most egregious cases, governments should carefully consider the
propriety of fee-financing. If fees are deemed necessary—perhaps to raise
essential revenue in the face of tax limits—they should be subject to principled
constraints. Indeed, banning one source of revenue may drive government agents
to create other, worse financial exactions. With that in mind, this Subpart
suggests how judges and policymakers might impose meaningful restraint on
criminal justice fees and reduce perverse incentives for collecting agencies.
Reforming criminal justice financing is a topic that deserves concerted and
thorough attention. This Subpart does not have the space to address such
financing generally. Nor does this Subpart describe a comprehensive reform
package for criminal justice fees. Rather, its aim is to suggest a short list of
criminal justice fee reforms based specifically on the public finance reasoning
herein. Other criminal justice fee problems—for example, race-based
motivations and racially disparate outcomes247—deserve and require their own
separate consideration and targeted responses.
Before describing the proposed reforms, it is also worth noting that this
Article does not advocate ability-to-pay inquiries for criminal justice fees, or
245. Many car accident fees only apply to out-of-town drivers. See Jaffe, supra note 239; INT’L FIRE CHIEFS
ASS’N, supra note 244.
246. For an example of such public policy advocacy by insurance companies, see STANTON & THESING,
supra note 239.
247. See generally Andrea Marsh & Emily Gerrick, Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective Policy
Responses to Modern Debtors’ Prisons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93 (2015) (arguing that a comprehensive
response to debtors’ prisons requires acknowledging race-based motivations).
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suggest basing fees on payors’ income.248 While ability-to-pay inquiries can be
beneficial, unbounded fees are problematic even if imposed only on those who
can afford to pay them. For example, even with such limits, police may continue
to target and exploit politically powerless groups, such as communities of color
or nonresidents.249 Moreover, ability-to-pay inquiries are invasive,
inconsistently applied, and difficult to administer.250 Thus, ability-to-pay
inquiries are insufficient to solve the problems raised herein.
1. Ban Nonmarket Criminal Justice Fees
Perhaps fee funding is wholly inappropriate in the criminal justice context,
where users have little control over consumption of a mandatory service
provided by a monopolistic agency. This is especially true where introducing
market-like forces would be difficult or impossible for various reasons. For
instance, allowing defendants to choose their criminal justice services might
undermine their punitive nature. It may also enable wealthier defendants to opt
into better services, creating a two-tiered criminal justice system.251 For these
reasons, banning most criminal justice fees may be the appropriate response.252
However, policymakers who wish to ban entire fee categories should also
ensure that government can equitably raise the missing revenue elsewhere.
Many local governments face tax limiting laws at the state level that make
raising non-fee revenue difficult.253 Eliminating or weakening tax limits is
necessary in those places. Without additional funding, agencies may respond to
fee bans by cutting vital public services or by crafting more exploitative and less
transparent revenue sources. Because of this, fee reforms that account for
agencies’ revenue needs may be more effective at addressing the problems
raised herein.
2. Judicial Reforms
As explained above, courts in some states have relaxed judicial fee doctrine,
making space for more creative financing mechanisms.254 Courts should
consider reversing this pattern for criminal justice fees because these fees lack
built-in restraints and thus require outside intervention. Broadly speaking, when
248. As an example of an ability-to-pay policy, Philadelphia eliminated fees as well as fines for defendants
with income at or below 125% of the federal poverty line. See Michael Tanenbaum, Philly D.A. Wipes Out Fines
and Fees for Impoverished Defendants, PHILLYVOICE (July 3, 2019), https://www.phillyvoice.com/larrykrasner-phiadelphia-no-fines-fees-indigent-defendants-poverty-courts/. An ability-to-pay inquiry is also already
required prior to incarcerating individuals for nonpayment. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983)
(holding that a court cannot incarcerate individuals for nonpayment of fees without a finding of willfulness).
249. See Zhen, supra note 89, at 192–95 (making this argument).
250. See id. at 201–04.
251. Alysia Santo, Victoria Kim & Anna Flagg, Upgrade Your Jail Cell—For a Price, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-pay-to-stay-jails/ (describing Los Angeles and Orange County’s
upgraded fee-funded jails).
252. Others have argued for abolishment of criminal justice fees. See Ruback, supra note 11, at 1800; Reitz,
supra note 11, at 1760.
253. See Jurow Kleiman, supra note 217, at 1887–88.
254. See supra Part II.C.
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adjudicating challenges to criminal court fees, courts should be especially
mindful of the incentives that fee-setting and collecting agencies face. For
instance, if resource-starved criminal courts and agencies must fund themselves
via fee collection, and if reviewing courts do not question the propriety of the
level of services assigned to payors, agencies will have the incentive and the
power to inflate fees by increasing judicial, carceral, and monitoring services.
Such considerations should be paramount to regulating criminal justice fees.255
This Subpart suggests two possible avenues through which courts might
increase judicial scrutiny of criminal justice fees: reengage a voluntariness
requirement and limit fees to actual expenditures. Importantly, the Article
merely introduces these opportunities as possible avenues for advocacy and
judicial reform. It is not a deep dive. Both strategies should be further explored
by courts, advocates, and scholars seeking solutions to the problem of criminal
fees.
a. Reengage Voluntariness Requirement
Although traditional user fee doctrine required that fees be voluntary, courts
in many states have abandoned or loosened this condition.256 By allowing fees
to apply to mandatory services, courts have enabled agencies to exploit captive
and powerless payors.257 Reengaging a strict voluntariness requirement may
reverse this pattern by rendering invalid such mandatory charges. However,
requiring voluntariness could also disqualify useful charges such as the
stormwater assessment fees described above. Advocates and courts should
therefore approach this strategy with caution.
In states where courts have eliminated a voluntariness requirement
altogether,258 such a strategy may prove difficult. However, some states’ fee
doctrine may leave room for challenge by continuing to require that user fees be
voluntary in some cases. Michigan may offer such an opportunity. In Bolt v. City
of Lansing, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a user fee must be
voluntary,259 meaning that the payor can “refuse or limit their use of the
commodity or service.”260 In the years since Bolt was decided, the Michigan

255. Certainly, some courts have considered courts’ and agencies’ incentives when adjudicating challenges
to criminal justice fees. Such inquiries typically focus on courts’, attorneys’, and agencies’ incentives to punish
or jail criminal defendants in contravention of their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 (1927) (holding that subjecting a defendant to a trial before a local judge and village mayor with a
“direct . . . pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant” violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Such incentives are certainly egregious, but they overlook fees’ financial consequences as
problematic in and of themselves.
256. See State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 741–42 (Haw. 1999) (summarizing the declining reliance on
voluntariness in determining the validity of fees).
257. See supra Parts II.A and III.B.
258. Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 741–42; Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 310–11, 311 n.8 (Colo.
1989) (declining to “engraft a ‘voluntariness’ factor onto the tax-fee distinction” in resolving the case).
259. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269–72 (Mich. 1998). The charge must “serve a regulatory
purpose” and be “proportionate to the necessary costs of the service.” Id. at 269.
260. Id. at 270.
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Court of Appeals has inconsistently applied such reasoning to criminal justice
fees.
Notably, in Dawson v. Secretary of State, the court considered substantial
“driver responsibility fees” assessed on misdemeanor and felony traffic
violations.261 The court held the fees to be invalid in part because “they [were]
clearly not voluntary, but automatic upon the conviction of relevant offenses.”262
Expanding such reasoning might create space to invalidate other similar criminal
court fees. However, the Michigan Court of Appeals has more recently held
otherwise, either finding criminal court charges to be allowable as taxes,263 or
simply declaring that the Bolt holding does not apply to criminal court charges
authorized by statute.264 In Michigan and similar states, courts should carefully
consider what incentives they create by acquiescing to mandatory criminal
justice charges. Doing so has allowed agencies to exploit powerless payors.
Reengaging a strict voluntariness requirement may reverse this pattern.
Invoking a voluntariness requirement should be approached with caution for
at least two reasons. For one, as in Michigan, a court can simply declare
involuntary fees to be allowable taxes.265 Such a tax would likely only be
declared invalid if it fails to meet tax procedural requirements, which differ
greatly from state to state. For instance, some states require that state or local
voters approve certain new taxes.266 In states without such requirements,
declaring a criminal justice fee to be a tax may simply remove it from user fee
analysis, and thus from rigorous court oversight, altogether. Second, reviving a
broadly applicable, strict voluntariness requirement could result in courts
invalidating other regulatory fees, such as the stormwater remediation fees
described above. Because such fees do not raise the same concerns as criminal
justice fees, stricter scrutiny for such fees is likely unnecessary. Thus, any
litigation strategy invoking the voluntariness requirement should be carefully
cabined to criminal justice fees.

261. Dawson v. Sec’y of State, 739 N.W.2d 339, 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). The fee amount ranged from
$1,000 to $2,000 and supported general revenue as well as fire protection funds. Id. at 345, 365.
262. Id. at 355.
263. In People v. Duke, the court classified criminal justice charges as taxes rather than fees, and merely
required a showing that the charge be reasonable as such. People v. Duke, No. 325473, 2016 WL 1445219, at
*1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2016) (remanding to the trial court and requiring it to “articulate a factual basis for
the costs it imposed”). The court reached a similar holding in People v. Cameron. People v. Cameron, No.
321387, 2015 WL 4599186, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 28, 2015), appeal denied, 929 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 2019).
Interestingly, upon denying the appeal in People v. Cameron, Michigan Supreme Court Justice McCormack
issued a concurrence that noted the special problems raised by the imposition of criminal court fees, including
“the pressures [district judges] face . . . to ensure their courts are well-funded.” 929 N.W.2d at 786.
264. People v. Knight, No. 324028, 2016 WL 716330, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016) (“We seriously
question the application of Bolt to the issue of court costs authorized by state statute.”).
265. This Article does not take the position that criminal justice fees are actually taxes. See supra note 49
and accompanying text.
266. See generally Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing laws
requiring voter approval of new taxes imposed by local governments).
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b. Limit Fees to Actual Expenditures
As explained above, current judicial fee doctrine in most states fails to
meaningfully limit criminal justice fees to actual expenses.267 Meanwhile, courts
and criminal justice agencies impose myriad fees with little incentive to ensure
that the amount collected reflects the costs imposed by the system user. To
remedy this, courts should require that criminal justice fees not exceed agencies’
actual expenditures on a defendant’s case. The Model Penal Code recommends
the same.268 Under such a rule, while total fees could fall below actual expenses,
in no event could they exceed expenditures.269 This rule would not only restrain
fee burdens, but by imposing substantiation costs on agencies, it would ensure
that agencies consider actual costs when determining fee levels.
Imposing a strictly enforced expenditure limit raises many challenges, the
greatest of which is defining clear and reasonable criteria for measuring per-case
expenditures. Such analysis requires thoughtfulness, rigor, and more space than
this Subpart allows. Rather than providing a detailed blueprint, this Subpart will
note several important considerations in the hope of encouraging further work
in this area, and with particular attention paid to incentives created for feelevying agencies.
Courts should consider limiting criminal justice fees to marginal costs only.
Where fees cover marginal costs, agencies face little financial incentive to inflate
fee-funded services because the fees only generate enough revenue to offset
those specific services. That is, there is no net revenue benefit to service
expansion. However, where fees encompass agencies’ fixed costs—such as
utilities or personnel—or capital expenditures—such as the cost to build a
courthouse—agencies can justify inflating services to satisfy general budgetary
needs.270 In such a case, resource-starved agencies face a financial incentive to
engage in fee-chasing behavior.
Courts should categorically disallow criminal justice fees from including
social costs, which are indeterminate, non-separable, and allow for essentially
unlimited fees.271 Indeed, fees covering social costs currently represent some of
the more egregious criminal charges, as they fund services entirely separate from
267. See supra Part II.C.
268. The Model Penal Code takes this position. See Reitz, supra note 11, at 1764 (“[N]o costs, fees, or
assessments may be imposed in excess of actual expenditures in the offender’s case.”).
269. The court in Bolt v. City of Lansing offers an example of such analysis in the context of stormwater
service fees. There, the court found that the charges included a significant portion of the $176 million total capital
expenditure underlying the project. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Mich. 1998). As a result, the
charges included investments in capital from which the city would benefit for many years, far beyond the benefit
provided to each individual payor. Id.
270. Fixed costs and capital costs would occur regardless of any one individual’s behavior. For instance, if
a courthouse must remain open during normal business hours, each individual user imposes no additional
marginal cost in terms of building utilities or court personnel. This is similar to the idea of “nonrivalrous” public
goods—goods in which one person’s use does not diminish that of another.
271. Despite these issues, courts have sanctioned fees covering social costs. See State v. Young, 238 So. 2d
589, 590 (Fla. 1970) (“It is not unreasonable that one who stands convicted of such an offense should be made
to share in the improvement of the agencies that society has had to employ in defense against the very acts for
which he has been convicted.”).
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a payor’s particular case. For example, criminal defendants currently pay fees to
cover counseling services for unrelated parties, educational programs, highway
maintenance funds, and so forth.272 Courts should invalidate such fees, as they
allow for ever expanding fee burdens and transform criminal courts into revenue
generators.
3. Policy Reforms
In addition to heightened judicial scrutiny of criminal court fees, state and
local policymakers should reduce agencies’ incentives to pursue increased fee
revenue. Perhaps most important, providing criminal courts and criminal justice
agencies with adequate non-fee revenue would drastically reduce the need for
alternative funds.273 In addition to better supporting the criminal justice system,
policymakers should reduce the direct financial benefits that agencies derive
from fees, by requiring fee-sharing and imposing a strict per-person fee cap.
a. Require Fee Sharing
Agencies will be less aggressive in levying fees if they do not directly
benefit from the collected fee revenue. Instead, fee revenue should be diverted
to the regional or state level—for example, to a state public safety fund that is
strictly monitored by independent agents outside of the criminal justice
system.274 The revenue can then be redistributed downward according to
exogenous criteria—for example, by district population.275 The Model Penal
Code and others have proposed the same.276
State reforms related to civil asset forfeiture can provide a model for such a
policy. Civil asset forfeiture laws allow law enforcement agencies to seize
property associated with illegal activity, even in the absence of a criminal
conviction.277 The practice has been roundly criticized in recent years for

272. See, e.g., State v. Claborn, 870 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Broyles v. State, 688 S.W.2d
290, 291 (Ark. 1985) (upholding a fee allocated to general programs addressing drunk driving and alcohol and
drug abuse rehabilitation); Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 510, 519–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (upholding a
fee that contributed to the state’s highway fund); Young, 238 So. 2d at 590.
273. CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, supra note 53, at 14 (arguing the same, and noting that executive and
legislative branches are constitutionally obligated to adequately fund the judicial branch).
274. Note that fee revenue cannot be diverted to general revenue, as this would convert the charge from a
fee to a tax in many states, and thus trigger additional procedural requirements. See San Juan Cellular Tel. Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of P.R., 967 F.2d 683, 685 (1st Cir. 1992) (“The classic ‘tax’ . . . . raises money,
contributed to a general fund, and spent for the benefit of the entire community.”); HENCHMAN, supra note 38,
at 621–22 (distinguishing taxes from fees).
275. MICHAEL MAKOWSKY, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL TO END REGRESSIVE TAXATION THROUGH
LAW ENFORCEMENT 16–17 (2019), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Makowsky_PP_20190314.pdf
(proposing that criminal justice revenue be remitted to the state level and redistributed downward to localities
by population size).
276. Reitz, supra note 11, at 1764 (describing the Model Penal Code); MAKOWSKY, supra note 275, at 16–
17.
277. See Anne Tiegen & Lucia Bragg, Evolving Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, 26 LEGISBRIEF, Feb. 2018,
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/cj/advancing-justice/Anne_Teigan_and_Lucia_Bragg_Evolving_
Civil_Asset_Forfeiture_Laws.pdf.
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incentivizing corrupt and exploitative behavior by collecting agencies.278 In
response, various states and Washington, D.C. have passed laws precluding
enforcement agencies from retaining the seized property.279 Some require that
proceeds be routed to the state level,280 others limit the percentage of local law
enforcement budgets that forfeitures can comprise.281 Such policies reduce law
enforcement agencies’ incentives to seize property in order to increase their
departments’ revenue. Similar rules for criminal justice fees would do the same.
b. Impose a Per-Person Fee Cap
Imposing a relatively low per-person cap on criminal justice fees would also
reduce perverse agency incentives. Such a rule would provide that any one
individual cannot bear total fees in excess of some set amount, say $100. A perperson cap would eliminate agency incentives to inflate services provided to
specific individuals, or to prolong monitoring periods to inflate fee revenue.282
It would also significantly reduce the human toll of such fees. However, even
with such a cap, agencies would still face incentives to target aggregate
resources at fee-funded activities, such as arrests generally, rather than non-fee
activities such as community engagement.
Each of these reforms, on its own, is insufficient to correct the problems
herein. However, if enacted together they would make criminal justice system
funding significantly fairer. If fees were subject to a per-person limit, in no event
higher than actual expenditures, and agencies were precluded from keeping the
funds, user fee levels would likely decrease significantly. More importantly, the
fees would be subject to meaningful constraint, reducing agencies’ incentives to
misallocate resources, and reducing the likelihood of exploitation of powerless
groups. Such reforms would benefit formerly incarcerated individuals struggling
to reenter society. Broader society would benefit as well, as public safety
agencies refocus their attention on community needs rather than revenue
generation.

278. Id.; Adam Brandon, Opinion, Time for Congress to Reform Civil Asset Forfeiture After Court Ruling,
HILL (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/431063-time-for-congress-to-reformcivil-asset-forfeiture-after-court-ruling; Forfeiture, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., https://www.nacdl.org/
forfeiture/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
279. See MAKOWSKY, supra note 275, at 15 (“As of early 2019 eight states do not allow the arresting police
department to retain seized property.”).
280. See IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 7. Although, notably, the Indiana Supreme Court
recently held that law enforcement agencies can keep seized property up to the cost of administering the case,
raising the same problems described herein. Olivia Covington, Divided Supreme Court Upholds Civil Forfeiture
Reimbursement of Law Enforcement, IND. LAW. (June 27, 2019), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/
50719-divided-supreme-court-upholds-civil-forfeiture-reimbursement-of-law-enforcement. A similar law in
Washington, D.C. requires that forfeiture proceeds be deposited into general funds. D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-310
(West 2020) (“The law enforcement agency that seized property forfeited under this chapter may not retain the
property for its own use or sell it directly or indirectly to an employee of the agency, to a relative of an employee,
or to another law enforcement agency . . . .”).
281. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-16-19(f)(4)(A)(ii) (West 2020) (precluding forfeited property from comprising
more than one third of the budget of local law enforcement agencies or task forces).
282. See Logan & Wright, supra note 98, at 1188 & n.83.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has applied a public finance lens to criminal justice fees to show
that they occur outside of the market-like environment envisioned for traditional
user fee financing. As a result, criminal justice fees operate without meaningful
restraint, and instead face upward pressure from monopolistic agencies seeking
increased revenue. These unbounded fees incentivize misallocation of public
resources, heighten the risk of exploitation of powerless groups, cause
significant human suffering, and deny payors meaningful protection from
exploitative government exactions.
This Article also sounds a warning alarm: Unbounded, nonmarket fees can
arise outside of the criminal justice system. To aid policymakers and advocates
in identifying and halting the spread of potentially exploitative fees, this Article
provides a list of problematic fee characteristics, the presence of which may
erode meaningful restraints. Policymakers and advocates can use this framework
to prevent unbounded nonmarket fees in other areas before they become
entrenched revenue streams.
Levying agencies are hardly to blame for nonmarket fees. They face an
unholy trinity of insufficient funding, the power to impose fees on captive
payors, and a mandate to provide vital public services. Rather, state and local
legislators—the architects of current funding shortfalls—and voters—the
drivers of such policies—bear the ultimate responsibility for creating the
incentives to which agency staff have responded.
But, there is good news. Policymakers and courts can correct these
incentives, and this Article provides a blueprint for how to do so. The answer
lies in prudent fiscal design based on thoughtful consideration of agency
incentives. Without such vigilance, government systems become victims of their
own profligacies, and public wellbeing suffers in the process.

